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Abstract 
This project proposes an ecocritical theory of scientific abstractions in order to investigate 
connections between scientific reason, societal organisation, and ecological decimation. The theory 
itself acts as a possible refinement of previous approaches, specifically the critique of the scientific 
outlook, as developed in Critical Theory from Lukács to Habermas. This largely theoretical endeavour 
is utilised in considering the concept of energy from thermodynamics and its larger cultural 
influences, as traced back to its origins in the scientific community of nineteenth-century Europe.  
I argue that the concept of energy carries implicit obligations towards unification, intertranslation and 
industry, that have been utilised in the prioritisation of production over ecology, also that energy as an 
abstraction has been materialised (reified) into a cultural object that successfully masks the destructive 
impact of fuels. This argument is principally supported through an engagement with the various 
formulations of the reification critique from three approaches in Critical Theory; Lukács, Adorno and 
Horkheimer, and Habermas, all of which expose the effects of commodity exchange on rationality 
and, I argue, scientific abstractions.  
Although largely a theoretical endeavour, the three approaches in Critical Theory are expanded into 
an analysis of the energy concept and its role in sustaining inaction towards the current ecological 
crisis. These include the public representation of oil companies and the persistence of neoclassical 
economic orthodoxy. Consequently, energy is investigated through its connection to theories of value, 
its representation in scientific and visual culture, its influence on the field of economics, and its 
position as a commodity.  
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Introduction 
 
The Voice of the Devil 
All Bibles or sacred codes have been the causes  
of the following Errors: 
     1. That Man has two real existing princi- 
-ples, viz. a Body and a Soul.  
     2. That Energy, called Evil, is alone from the  
Body, and that Reason, called Good, is alone from  
the Soul. 
     3. That God will torment Man in Eternity 
for following his Energies.  
     But the following Contraries to these are True.  
     1. Man has no Body distinct from his Soul 
for that called Body is a portion of Soul discerned  
by the five Senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this  
age.  
     2. Energy is the only life and is from the Body  
and Reason is the bound or outward circumference  
of Energy.  
     3. Energy is Eternal Delight. 
- William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 1 
Energy transforms: In its contemporary usage—already pushed through the theoretical and cultural 
system of modern physics—energy connects and unifies all material phenomena through an 
underlying continuation. The disparate sensations of motion, heat, friction, and fatigue are all 
explained as merely different perceptive approaches to an underlying and ongoing energy process; 
continuation through the transformation of a single quantity.  
Blake evokes energy prior to any notion of thermodynamics. Yet we observe in his prophetic treatise 
the very same duality. Energy is both evil and essential; foundational and fearful. In Blake’s 
Marriage, the devil’s voice mocks Emanuel Swedenborg’s strict dichotomy of heaven and hell, good 
                                                          
1 William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Copy E (London, 1794), p.4. 
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and evil, soul and body, in favour of a spiritualism that requires coexistence. ‘Without Contraries is no 
progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human 
existence’.2  
Energy, at Blake’s time, would partly signify the lineage of energia (ενέργεια) from Aristotle, 
meaning actuality as counter-distinct to potentiality, dunamis (δύναμις), the necessary conditions for 
and realisation of change and motion.3 Energia would initiate the general conception of energy, the 
capacity to produce an effect, traceable back to the sixteenth-century.  Yet Blake also clearly arouses 
energy as a quality of excitement and intensity, the carnal force of sensation, a meaning that was still 
developing in the eighteenth-century. 4 
Even Blake’s theological usage, however, cannot compare to the transformation in meaning and 
importance energy would undergo throughout the nineteenth century. As with the emergence of a 
palpably ‘modern science’, with the discipline of physics at its helm, energy takes a central role in the 
conceptual reconfiguration of the world.  
* 
The meaning of energy derived from thermodynamics may be used in defining our use of the term 
(scientific) abstraction. An abstraction here delineates a concept that exists via the taking away of 
information, or by tracing common elements amongst phenomena.5 Abstractions can be thought of as 
the bracketing of qualitative information in order to isolate a causal explanation, usually one that can 
be measured. An abstraction therefore represents both the process of making a concept and a 
particular kind of concept; a quantity considered to be real (or relational) such as mass, gravity, or 
energy—notice these examples convey scientific explanations that cannot be viewed directly, but only 
through their presence in other objects such as planets, cars and molecules. I would also like to make 
a distinction between abstractions and abstract concepts (such as time, causality, or freedom), as 
                                                          
2 Blake, p. 3. 
3 Potentiality and actuality are explicated in book Θ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics; Aristotle, The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) v.II, pp.1651-1661. Also see Stephen 
Menn, ‘The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Ένέργεια: Ένέργεια and Δύναμις’, Ancient Philosophy, 14, 1 
(1994), 73-114. 
4 For an overview of the many different senses of energy in the OED; Clifford Sofield, ‘Release Notes: The 
many faces of energy’ (2018), <https://public.oed.com/blog/release-notes-the-many-faces-of-energy/> [accessed 
20 September 2019]. 
5 A notion originating in Locke. However, I do not wish to hold, as Locke does, that this is necessarily how the 
mind functions; only that abstractions are a particular form of concept. John Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, ed. by J. M. Dent (London: Everyman, 1993[1690]) p. 88. 
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abstractions here are considered to make up the foundation of the physical world while still remaining 
part of it. Alongside all concepts, however, abstractions will be treated as social entities—they are 
created and handed down, justified, dismissed and sometimes even deified in the process of making 
sense of the world.6 
This dissertation intends to set out an ecocritical theory of scientific abstractions that can measure 
their cultural impact without rejecting their legitimacy. In evidencing this theory, a question this 
dissertation seeks to answer is How, if at all, has the concept of energy from thermodynamics been 
complicit in the social practices that sustain the crisis of global warming? The method of investigation 
appeals to the concept of ‘reification’ from Critical Theory to provide a catalyst between the cultural 
impact of scientific abstractions and the societal organisation that reproduces ecological devastation. 
The project, therefore, is inevitably one of explication and the ‘mapping’ of abstractions, rather than 
exposing tangible ecological problems.  
The conservation of energy from nineteenth-century thermodynamics will be invoked as an archetypal 
instance of scientific abstraction, one that is has been reified to become what I term energy as energy; 
and mobilised in justifying the political and industrial dogma of a society dependent on fossil fuel 
consumption. These views of energy, it will be argued, obfuscate the necessary political and social 
reorganisation required from the crisis of global warming and ecological decimation. 
The readings of Critical Theory from Lukács to Habermas are intended to excavate an anxiety around 
the cultural impact of scientific abstractions, namely their hold over political and sociological 
discourse. Isabelle Stengers, in analysing the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead, notes a similar concern 
with ‘the lack of resistance characteristic of the modern epoch to the intolerant rule of abstractions 
that declare everything that escapes them frivolous, insignificant, or sentimental’.7 Yet the Frankfurt 
School in particular provide a connective mechanism between political economy, psychological 
experience and interpersonal communication that may prove vital when appraising the influence of 
scientific abstraction in everyday life. Here, energy provides a conceptual bridge to rehabilitate 
Critical Theory under current economic and ecological imperatives. 
                                                          
6 Isabelle Stengers Thinking with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts, trans. by M. Chase 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 123-42. Also see; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, trans. by H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 15-34. 
7 Isabelle Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, p. 136; in reference to Whitehead’s Science and the Modern 
World; Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926). 
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The connection between psychology, sociology and political economy that makes up the reification 
critique are threefold: 8 
1)  The experience of our surroundings is rendered into ‘objects’ by over-applying the 
quantification and valuation necessary for commodity exchange.  
2) In approaching our interaction with others from this reifying stance, we thereby take an 
instrumental approach to inter-human communication.  
3) Abstracting from ourselves the useful and ‘commodifiable’ facets of our psychology (e.g. 
‘intelligence’, ‘creativity’, ‘entrepreneurship’, etc.) and emphasising these qualities to the point where 
they become external to us. 
As reification is going to constitute the catalyst between energy as a scientific abstraction and the 
crisis of global warming, the structure of this study follows three formulations of reification 
throughout a strand of ‘Western Marxism’, from Lukács, to Horkheimer and Adorno, to Habermas.9 It 
is proposed that these three forms of reification (that loosely map onto a concern with value, 
epistemology, and societal organisation respectively) provide different mechanisms for scientific 
concepts to extend beyond their realm of application. A new all-encompassing theory of reification 
will not be attempted, nor will one formulation be defended against the others. Rather, I am interested 
in the many ways in which scientific abstractions can become politicised through the logic of 
commodity transaction.  
Section 1 looks at the emergence of energy within the science of thermodynamics through nineteenth-
century Europe, as well as the emergence of reification as a sociological critique in the work of 
György Lukács. By investigating the historical and cultural facets of thermodynamics, I intend to 
show how abstractions are formed under a conglomeration of social presuppositions and political 
motives; most conspicuously the desire for unification.  
                                                          
8 Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, ed. by M. Jay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p.22. For an influential parallel to this idea, see Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: 
Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).  
9 The term ‘Western Marxism’ was introduced by Merleau-Ponty to characterise the tradition of theorists who 
followed Lukács in rejecting the more ‘scientific’ form of Marxism spearheaded by Engels and Lenin. It is 
typically a short hand for twentieth-century Marxists critical of the Soviet system: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Adventures of the Dialectic, trans. by J. Bien (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 [1955]). The 
phrase Critical Theory used here will denote the three approaches of Western Marxism covered, unless stated 
otherwise. 
9 
 
The discussion of Lukács elucidates reification in its original formulation and its central reference to 
the Marxist commodity structure; as well as looking at its concern with science and abstractive 
thought. This will help to sketch out an ecocritical theory of abstractions, which will be contrasted 
with other key ecocritical approaches in order to map out some of its primary assumptions (in 
particular, a refutation of deep ecology and holism).  
Crucial to reification is a conception of value, which constitutes a connective theme in the current 
investigation. This is not only because value connects a dimension of psychology and experience to 
matters of political economy through what is subjectively perceived as valuable, but also because 
what our present society values speaks directly to issues around conservation, preservation and 
ecology. This is evidenced by those who explore Marx’s contribution to Green movements via his 
‘labour theory’ of value.10  
The critique of reification takes an epistemological turn in Section 2. This is achieved through a 
reading of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment that explicates the method through 
which they link abstractive thinking to concerns around ecological decimation. Their critique of 
positivism is explored, and it is argued that both a positivist and a contradictory ‘vulgar realist’ 
version of the energy concept result in different forms of reification. That is, abstractions such as the 
energy concept may become reifacts when denied their emergence in historical, cultural and political 
contexts, whereby they become employed as ‘norm-free’ political tools.11 
Section 3 moves on to the functionalist formulation of reification proposed by Jürgen Habermas, 
specifically in its manifestation as the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ put forward in The Theory of 
Communicative Action. This is in order to assess the influence that major scientific abstractions such 
as energy may have on our ability to communicate (lifeworld) and in the organisation of society 
(system). The debate around the ecological applicability of Habermas’s theory indicates a concern 
that an overreliance on communication inhibits its ability to account for the global warming crisis.  
                                                          
10 Matthew Huber, ‘Value, Nature and Labor: A defence of Marx’, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 28, 1 (2017), 
39-52; Paul Burkett, ‘Nature in Marx Reconsidered’, Organisation and Environment, 10, 2 (1997), 164-83. 
Also, for a classic text, see Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, trans. by B. Fowkes (London: New 
Left Books, 1971 [1962]) pp. 63-75. 
11 ‘Reifact’ taken from Sónia Silva, ‘Reification and Fetishism: Processes of transformation’, Theory, Culture & 
Society, 30, 1 (2013), 79-98: ‘Fetishes do not share their ontological status, physical appearance, or functional 
attributes; they share their being reifacts. To speak of fetishism is to speak of reification, the universal human 
tendency to apprehend abstractions as things’, p. 80. 
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I argue that the concept of energy is reified into a commodity that masks the inherent instability of 
fossil fuel consumption. The influence of energy on social organisation is further explored by the 
appropriation of thermodynamics in justifying neoclassical economic structures that still dominate the 
field, a position ultimately incapable of accounting for the imminent catastrophes of global warming.   
A theme throughout consists in diagnosing the misapplication of scientific abstractions to ethical or 
political realms, a concern shared with certain constructivist readings of science.12 The production of 
scientific facts within a given disciplinary or experimental context—whether this makes them real or 
not—in some way designates their scope of applicability. In much the same way that vulgar readings 
of evolution have often led to (or perhaps only justified) a patriarchal defence of gender normativity, I 
will argue that thermodynamics has been mobilised in the formation of political structuring frequently 
referred to as neoliberalism.  
* 
An interdisciplinary approach emerging under the name of ‘energy humanities’ attempts to show the 
ways in which ‘the energy riches of the past two centuries have influenced our relationships to our 
bodies, moulded human social relations, and impacted the imperatives of even those varied activities 
we group together under the term “culture” ’.13 This approach implies, therefore, that our epistemic 
connection to fossil fuels goes beyond simply knowing the problematic implications of their use, 
instead becoming an active participant in knowledge formation in contemporary society on both 
individual and intersubjective levels. In other words, the creation of what has been termed a 
‘petroculture’ has brought with it a potential distortion of perceptual experience, one that figures pre-
consciously and pervasively. The similarities between this approach and my own manifest in drawing 
out the transformative capability within the materiality of fuels (as well as fuels anthropomorphic 
qualities imbued upon them) and how this may alter our stance towards the world around us.14 
However, I wish to push the scope of investigation into the scientific conception of energy itself, as 
well as the direct impact thermodynamics has had on/from wider cultural realms.15 Therefore, 
                                                          
12 Particularly exemplified in Stengers’s Cosmopolitics: Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, trans. by R. Bonobo 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Cosmopolitics II, trans. by R. Bonobo (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2011). 
13 Imre Szeman, and Dominic Boyer, eds., Energy Humanities: An Anthology (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University, 2017), p. 2. 
14 For example, Frederick Buell, ‘A Short History of Oil Cultures: Or, the marriage of catastrophe and 
exuberance’ Journal of American Studies, 46, 2 (2012), 273-293. 
15 Important texts on the culture of thermodynamics have been: Serres’s chapter ‘Turner Translates Carnot’ 
which explicates the realisation of thermodynamics in nineteenth century artwork; Michel Serres, Hermes: 
Literature, Science, Philosophy, trans. J. V. Harari and D. F. Bell (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
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included is an example of how the cultural views derived from thermodynamics, its scientific and 
visual representation, have been utilised by oil companies and industrial complexes in the process of 
this distortion.  
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School tradition has often been invoked in formulating an 
environmental sociology and ecological theory. This has often functioned through an exploration of 
the concept of ‘nature’ in Critical Theory, such as those by Kate Soper and Steven Vogel.16 Ryan 
Gunderson has collated the various ways that the ‘first generation’ (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse) 
have been influential in environmental sociology surrounding the treatment of animals and technology 
respectively;17 as well as the controversy surrounding Habermas’s break from the previous Critical 
Theorists.18 Sabine Wilke represents a recent attempt to harmonise the philosophy of (primarily) 
Adorno with the demands of the Anthropocene.19 Here, however, I propose that the Frankfurt School 
can be used to analyse the impact of scientific abstractions, with the ecological crisis forming the 
                                                          
1982), pp. 54-64. Clarke expands on this work in the use of energy as allegory; Bruce Clarke, Energy Forms: 
Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2001). Rabinbach presents a thorough analysis of the influence of thermodynamics on psychology and body-
image; Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1990). Smith  has given  a cultural history of nascent energy physics in Victorian 
Britain and its connection to industrial and marine engineering; Crosbie Smith, The Science of Energy: A 
Cultural History of Energy Physics in Victorian Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); 
‘Engineering Energy: Constructing a new physics for Victorian Britain’, in The Oxford Handbook of the History 
of Physics, ed. by J. Z. Buchwald and R. Fox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Harman gives a concise 
overview of the conceptual turn in physics and the role of energy in the establishment of physics; Peter Harman, 
Energy Force and Matter: The Conceptual Development of Nineteenth-Century Physics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
16 Kate Soper, What is Nature?: Culture, Politics and the Non-Human (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). Steven Vogel, 
Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996); Thinking like a Mall: 
Environmental Philosophy after the End of Nature (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016). 
17 Ryan Gunderson, ‘The First-generation Frankfurt School on the Animal Question: Foundations for a 
normative sociological animal studies’, Sociological Perspectives, 57, 3 (2014a), 285-300; ‘Environmental 
Sociology and the Frankfurt School 1: Reason and capital’, Environmental Sociology, 1, 3 (2015), 224-35; 
‘Environmental Sociology and the Frankfurt School 2: Ideology, techno-science, reconciliation’, Environmental 
Sociology, 2, 1 (2016), 64-76. Also see the essays collated in Andrew Biro, ed., Critical Ecologies: The 
Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011). 
18 Ryan Gunderson, ‘Habermas in Environmental Thought: Anthropocentric Kantian or forefather of ecological 
democracy?’, Sociological Inquiry, 84, 4 (2014b), 626-53. 
19 Sabine Wilke, ‘Enlightenment, Dialectic, and the Anthropocene: Bruised nature and the residues of freedom’, 
Telos, 177 (2016), 83-106; ‘Critical Theory and Ecology: The shape of performance in the Anthropocene’, 
Telos, 183 (2018) 25-46. Also see Harriet Johnson, ‘The Reification of Nature: Reading Adorno in a warming 
world’, Constellations, 26 (2019), 318–329. 
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looming backdrop and reconnecting us with contemporary research in the fields of green policy, 
science and technology studies, and ecocriticism more generally.  
Moreover, this study has set its sight on one particular facet of Critical Theory within the Frankfurt 
School tradition, reification, which has its own (head-scratching) past.20 Whitehead, in reference to 
Zeno, stated that ‘to be refuted in every century after you have written is the acme of triumph’, and it 
is starting to seem that reification in its many forms is making for a sociological equivalent.21 Indeed, 
the current investigation benefits from the recent resurgent interest in reification following Axel 
Honneth’s monograph. 22 However, a detailed discussion of Honneth’s theory in an ecological context 
is left to another investigation.  
  
                                                          
20 See Pitkin for an account of all the various understandings of this single concept; Hannah Pitkin, ‘Rethinking 
Reification’, Theory and Society, 16, 2 (1987), 263–93.  
21 Alfred N. Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), p. 114. 
22 See Honneth, Butler, Lear, Geuss and Jay collected in Honneth, Reification. Further responses by Timo 
Jütten, ‘What is Reification? A critique of Axel Honneth’, Inquiry, 53, 3, (2010), 235-56; Alastair Morgan, ‘The 
“Living Entity”: Reification and forgetting’, European Journal of Social Theory, 17, 4 (2014), 377-388; David 
Schafer, ‘Pathologies of Freedom: Axel Honneth's unofficial theory of reification’ Constellations, 25 (2018), 
421– 31; and Matthew Smetona, ‘Reification: A defence of Lukács’s original formulation’, Angelaki, 23, 5 
(2018), 32-47. Also see Anita Chari, ‘Toward a Political Critique of Reification: Lukács, Honneth and the aims 
of Critical Theory’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 36, 5 (2010), 587-606; Todd Hedrick, Reconciliation and 
Reification: Freedom's Semblance and Actuality from Hegel to Contemporary Critical Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018); and Dimitris Gakis, ‘Reification and Immaterial Production’, Philosophy & Social 
Criticism (2019). 
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Section 1: ‘Class Consciousness’ and Thermodynamics 
They held the commodity in healthy disdain; and the commodity itself, finding no 
comfortable home among them, naturally fled.  
-Saro-Wiwa, ‘The Inspector Calls’.23 
This first section intends to set out in greater detail the concepts being employed in formulating an 
ecocritical theory of abstractions. Firstly, I intend to clarify the position of the energy concept from 
thermodynamics as an archetypal scientific abstraction, and to prove that such abstractions form under 
the pressure of political and cultural demands prevalent in their historical context of emergence. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that in outlining the historical influence on abstractions I intend 
to make no claim to an implicit falsity—even where this history may be considered morally 
reprehensible. Evidently, the concept of energy from thermodynamics has easily exceeded the bounds 
of its crucible in nineteenth century Europe; and remains a foundation for the theoretical endeavours 
of contemporary physics and environmental policy alike. Rather, the purpose of investigating the 
historicity of abstractions in this way is to discover what these scientific theories may implicitly 
compel us to ascribe to when we accept them as true descriptions of the world around us. 
Once thermodynamic energy has been outlined as a scientific abstraction, the concept of reification 
will be defined through its initial treatment in the work of Lukács, specifically in the text History and 
Class Consciousness. Particular emphasis will be given to its concern with science and scientific 
theory, as well as its concern more generally with the connection between ideas (or consciousness) 
and capitalist production beyond the crude base-superstructure formulation commonly ascribed to an 
idea of Marxist theory.24 The ecocritical reading of Lukács will then be clarified by contrasting it with 
a selection from the field of ecocriticism, which will go some way to delineate what a critique of 
abstractions entails. 
Finally, the significance of energy and reification in setting out an ecocritical theory of abstractions 
will be buttressed by investigating the connections between the two concepts—as reification is 
interpreted as a response, in part, to the obligations for a unified cosmological outlook and value 
implicit in the energy concept.  
                                                          
23 Ken Saro-Wiwa, A Forest of Flowers (Essex: Longman, 1995), p. 16. 
24 For a critique of the base-superstructure interpretation of Marx, see Raymond Williams, ‘Base and 
Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, New Left Review, 0, 82 (1973), 4-17. 
14 
 
1.1 Energy and the Vase of Circe: The emergence of a concept 
Around 1850, the western European scientific community witnessed what would be later deemed a 
‘simultaneous discovery’.25 In the universities and scientific academies primarily of France, Germany, 
England, and Scotland, physicists were publishing ground-breaking work on the conversion and 
conservation of heat and motion. Energy became the name to symbolise the quantification of this 
translation, and one of its defining features would be its ability to intertranslate disparate properties, 
fields, and disciplines. 26 
Although Kuhn located the roots of this simultaneous discovery in a shared philosophy of nature, I 
argue that in many ways the willingness to embrace the energy concept had underlying social causes, 
specifically a shared desire for the unification of the sciences:27  
The unity of science had been called for by the cultural stipulations of the Enlightenment and the 
colonial sentiments of a European superiority that went with it. Throughout the eighteenth century, 
Enlightenment thought had become almost synonymous with supporting scientific intervention in 
pedagogy, politics, and even religion—establishing science as possessing an almost unrivalled 
cultural potency by the nineteenth century. Advancements in science were not only crucial in 
expanding empires, but a unified science meant that a cohesive ideology could be spread throughout 
colonies: ‘The common bond of analysis is daily expanding its empire, and will ultimately embrace 
almost every subject in its formulae’.28 (See fig.1). 
                                                          
25 See Thomas Kuhn, ‘Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery’, in Critical Problems in 
the History of Science, ed. by M. Clagett (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959) pp. 321-56. 
26 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (London: Verso, 
1984), p.106. 
27 This and the following analysis are informed by Stephen Gaukroger, Civilization and The Culture of Science: 
Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1795-1935 (in press), ch.3 and 4—obtained via private correspondence. 
Also see Yehuda Elkana, The Discovery of the Conservation of Energy (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1974), for an influential overview of energy and its social presuppositions. 
28 Mary Sommerville. On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences, (London: John Murray, 1831), p. 413. 
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Figure 1: G. F. Watts, the infamous Victorian artist, pictured in front of a cast of his last sculpture, 
‘Physical Energy’, ‘a symbol of that restless physical impulse to seek the unachieved in the domain of 
material things’.29 Of the four full-size bronze casts made, one remains in Kensington Gardens, 
London; another stands guard to the Cecil Rhodes Memorial, Cape Town; a third, commissioned by 
the contemptible British South Africa Company for the steps of the Lusaka High Court in colonial 
Rhodesia, can now be found in the grounds of the National Archives in Harare, Zimbabwe.  
                                                          
29 Description by the sculptor in George Watts, George Frederic Watts, Vol.3: His Writings, ed. by M. Watts 
(London: Macmillan, 1912), p. 270. Image; G. F. Watts with the plaster model of 'Physical Energy', outside his 
sculpture studio in Kensington, 1890s; retrieved from <https://www.royalacademy.org.uk/exhibition/physical-
energy> [accessed 25 September 2019].  
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In many cases, a unification of science became wrapped up with nationalist sentiments. For example, 
du Bois-Reymond viewed scientific unification achieved by the energy concept not only to be a 
symbol of the political unification of Germany, but in fact beheld the newly possible connections 
between the German universities as being causal in the political process. Whereas in Britain the 
dissemination of affordable science literature that required a more approachable overview of science 
as a single coherent subject (e.g. through Henry Brougham’s Society for the Diffusion of Useful 
Knowledge) had strong connections to ‘progressive’ Whig ideology and politics.30 
In fulfilling the role of grand unifier within national and colonial realms, thermodynamics reflected a 
goal it implicitly shared with Enlightenment philosophy. As Prigogine and Stengers note, the 
‘tendency to see natural phenomena as the products of an underlying reality that remains constant 
throughout its transformations’ has an eerie closeness to the Kantian conception of the noumena—and 
Herman von Helmholtz was especially cognisant of the Kantian inflection behind energy, viewing it 
as the a priori foundation for the possibility of all science:31  
The theoretical science of nature shall have fulfilled its mission when the reduction 
of phenomena to elementary forces is accomplished and when this reduction is 
known to be the only possible one. Then the reduction would be proved to be the 
necessary comprehending form of our conception of nature, and it would be 
regarded as objectively true.32 
However, the philosophical explicitness of Helmholtz was in no means shared by his fellow nascent 
physicists who, as we shall observe, saw thermodynamics as necessarily in opposition to metaphysics. 
Of course, mathematical reduction had been proposed as a foundation to a united science since at least 
Galileo and Kepler. However, it was not until the refinement of rational mechanics (Descartes, 
Newton, Huygens, etc.) by mathematicians such as Leonhard Euler and Lagrange that mechanical 
reductions began to gain the predictive power necessary for their larger acceptance. Yet the physical 
equivalence of this already accepted mathematical unification was decidedly lacking, and new 
                                                          
30 James Secord, Visions of Science: Books and Readers at the Dawn of the Victorian Age (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), pp. 109-112. 
31 Prigonine and Stengers, p. 110. 
32 Helmholtz, quoted in Olivier Darrigol, Physics and necessity: rationalist pursuits from the Cartesian past to 
the quantum present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 77, my emphasis.  
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theories of heat transference tended to completely replace older ones (such as Fresnel’s luminiferous 
ether) rather than refining them towards some generally recognised theory.33 
In 1834, Mary Somerville’s On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences would grip the imagination of 
Regency Britain with claims to a mathematical link between sciences, suggesting ‘that they will 
ultimately be referred to the same agent: and in all there exists such a bond of union, that proficiency 
cannot be attained in any one without a knowledge of the others’.34 Somerville’s popular book 
collated many of the disparate fields in natural philosophy at the time, providing an imaginative and 
accessible insight into the establishment of a new science; one that could attest to its own validity 
through the ‘intertranslatability’ of its concepts. 35 
Another key text relevant to us in the unfolding of the energy concept is Peter Guthrie Tait and 
William Thompson’s Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867), in which the discordant authors offered 
a thoroughly reformed natural philosophy, with Joule’s experimentally proofed conservation of 
energy at its foundation, yet masked in presentation as a re-reading of Newton’s near-sacred 
Principia.36 Again, a nationalist disposition was perhaps influential in strengthening a long line of 
Scottish empiricism, in so doing establishing a physics devoid of the metaphysics purported by 
followers of Leibniz on the continent. This anti-metaphysical stance went so far as to employ a purely 
measurable/pragmatic definition of matter as something perceptible through the senses, to the private 
dismay of more philosophically informed scientists such as James Clerk Maxwell.37 Publicly, 
however, Maxwell would unequivocally praise the Treatise in his Nature review, perhaps indicating a 
significance to the physicist community too important for philosophical nit-picking.  
More local matters also played a role for Thomson and Tait as, with the conservation of energy being 
contextualised within the working machine and direct gratitude towards local hero James Watt, the 
wealth-producing industrial power of 1860s Glasgow was implicitly called upon as supporting 
                                                          
33 Gaukroger, ch.3. 
34 Somerville , p. v; Secord, pp. 107-137. 
35 ‘Intertranslatability’ taken from Gaukroger. 
36 Smith, The Science of Energy, pp. 192-210. 
37 Smith, The Science of Energy, p. 200. Maxwell, misquoting Berkeley, in turn quoting Evangelista Torricelli, 
argues that matter can never be perceived: ‘Matter is nothing but an enchanted vase of Circe fitted to receive 
Impulse and Energy, essences so subtle that nothing but the inmost nature of material bodies is able to contain 
them’; James Clerk Maxwell, The Scientific Letters and Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Vol. II. Ed. by P. M. 
Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 395. Berkeley does not use ‘Energy and Impulse’, but 
rather ‘force and the momenta of impulse’; George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, Vol II. Trans. and 
ed. by G. N. Wright (London: Thomas Tegg, 1843), p. 86.  
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evidence. A typical entwinement of empiricism and industry—the foundation of a renovated physics 
was one that could bring wealth to the empire, launching productivity as the new metaphysics.  
As implied, energy in the nineteenth century did not remain simply one scientific theory among many, 
it enveloped the discipline to become synonymous with scientific investigation itself; the science of 
energetics. In a paper delivered to the Glasgow Philosophical Society in 1855 titled ‘Outlines of the 
Science of Energetics’, W. J. M Rankine set out the basic tenets of this new method. The first axiom 
of which returns us to our opening statements: 
The efforts and passive accidents to which the branches of physics relate are various 
and heterogeneous; but they are all connected with energy, a uniform species of 
quantity, which pervades every branch of physics.  
This axiom is also equivalent to saying, that energy is transformable and 
transferable….38 
Yet in reaching this conclusion Rankine shows his cards quite clearly; priority is given to physical 
over abstract theories, and in turn to abstractive over hypothetical methods of forming these physical 
theories; of which mechanics and energy form pinnacle cases. Abstractive methods are delineated as 
the commonalities between observable phenomena such as the motion ‘common to the fall of heavy 
bodies, the flow of streams, the tides, the winds, the vibrations of sonorous bodies, the revolutions of 
the stars’. 39 These abstractive approaches characteristic of mechanics deserve widespread application 
due to their predictive power and utility—the encroachment towards a ‘perfect engine’. Whereas 
hypothetical theories have the potential to become ‘evil’ when used to ‘explain away, or set aside, 
facts inconsistent with these hypotheses’.40  
Our use of abstraction is not the same as Rankine’s. Abstract theories in Rankine’s system represent 
those of a metaphysical quality, as their presence is assumed rather than observed in physical 
interactions. Abstractive methods, however, are praised as those that filter out the unnecessary 
qualities of physical objects in formulating a theory. To Rankine, energy represents an ideal example 
of a physical-abstractive theory—as the abstracted connections common to motion, heat, and 
chemical reactions. We, however, have noted that even with the purported abstractive method of the 
                                                          
38 William J. M. Rankine, ‘Outlines of the science of energetics’, Edinburgh philosophical journal, 30 
(Edinburgh: Neill and Company, 1855), p. 14.  
39 Rankine, p. 5.  
40 Rankine, p.7.  
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energy concept comes a number of obligations and outlooks typical to the cultural stipulations of 
nineteenth century Europe, and thereby imbibed with a fundamental proclivity towards productivity, 
unification, and intertranslatability. The consequences of such obligations will be explored through 
our current reading of Critical Theory, starting with the work of Lukács.  
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1.2 The Emergence of a Concept II: Value, reified 
Caleb Garth often shook his head in meditation on the value, the indispensable might 
of that myriad-headed, myriad-handed labour by which the social body is fed, 
clothed, and housed. It had laid hold of his imagination in boyhood. The echoes of 
the great hammer where roof or keel were a-making, the signal-shouts of the 
workmen, the roar of the furnace, the thunder and plash of the engine, were a sublime 
music to him; the felling and lading of timber, and the huge trunk vibrating star-like 
in the distance along the highway, the crane at work on the wharf, the piled-up 
produce in warehouses, the precision and variety of muscular effort wherever exact 
work had to be turned out, - all these sights of his youth acted on him as poetry 
without the aid of the poets, had made a philosophy for him without the aid of 
philosophers, a religion without the aid of theology.   
- George Eliot, Middlemarch.41 
György Lukács’s 1923 text History and Class Consciousness shares its approach with that of an early 
sociology exemplified by Weber and Simmel, one which conceptualised the practices of a modern 
society in distinction to those of a traditional society.42 Underpinning Lukács’s appropriation of 
Weberian rationalisation, however, is a philosophical investigation of Marx’s commodity-structure 
and commodity-fetishism; as well as an explanation to the inaction of the proletariat of his native 
Hungary, to their lack of a ‘class consciousness’.  
In the opening section of Capital I, Marx demonstrates the underlying value of commodities qua the 
value of human labour: ‘As exchange-values, all commodities are merely definite quantities of 
congealed labour-time’.43 It is precisely this root labour-value that allows commodities to be 
exchanged. That is, when qualitatively different objects are equated in a trade situation (e.g. one coat 
for twenty yards of linen), it is the abstracted human labour socially necessary in the production of 
both that allows them to be compared, thus losing most of the qualitative information in the process. 
This process, prescribed as a labour theory of value co-opted from the classical economist Ricardo, 
                                                          
41 George Elliot, Middlemarch (London: Penguin, 1965 [1872]), p. 283. 
42 György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. by R. Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971 
[1923]); abbreviated to HCC.  
43 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans. by B. Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 130, emphasis in original. 
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represents Marx’s attempt to solve the interminable problem of commensurability in theorising trade, 
how qualitatively different objects can be meaningfully exchanged, and their value measured. 44  
Consequently, Capital presents a commodity only simple at face value, in fact ‘abounding in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties’ (Marx, p. 163). For whenever raw materials are 
furnished into commodities they are imbued with a particular sense of legitimacy in their transition.45 
In the process of this transformation ‘the commodity reflects the social characteristics of the products 
of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things’ (Marx, pp. 164-65). That is, the 
commodity appears objective and immutable, losing signs of its social origin in labour.  
Lukács, in his essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’, takes this phenomenon of 
objective appearance and expands it in order to answer the question ‘How far is commodity exchange 
together with its structural consequences able to influence the total outer and inner life of society?’ 
(HCC, p. 84).  
The answer to which is significantly so, for the commodity-structure permeates throughout societal 
life by attaching itself to processes of modernisation that structure the psychological formation of 
value, such as work institutions and money, as evidenced by Weber and Simmel respectively. The 
institutionalisation of the commodity-structure allows for labour, bureaucratic/managerial, and even 
creative work to be reified into objects devoid of sociality—even one’s own abilities begin to appear 
as external commodities. Money and economic structures aid in the spread of reification through the 
quantification of value, invading all facets of our public and private lives. 
The mechanism of reification is thus summarised:  
The transformation of the commodity relation into a thing of ‘ghostly objectivity’ 
cannot therefore content itself with the reduction of all objects for the gratification of 
human needs to commodities. It stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of 
                                                          
44 The typical view, however, that Marx simply took the labour theory of value from Ricardo, is challenged by 
David Harvey, ‘Marx’s Refusal of the Labour Theory of Value’ (2018), <http://davidharvey.org/2018/03/marxs-
refusal-of-the-labour-theory-of-value-by-david-harvey/> [accessed 20 September 2019]. 
45 In an excellent passage, Marx relates the commodity of a table: 
The form of wood, for instance, is altered if a table is made out of it. Nevertheless the table 
continues to be wood, an ordinary sensuous thing. But as soon as it emerges as a commodity, 
it changes into a thing which transcends sensuousness. It not only stands with its feet on the 
ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its 
wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own 
free will (Marx, pp. 163-64). 
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man; his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they 
are things which he can ‘own’ or ‘dispose of’ like the various objects of the external 
world. And there is no natural form in which human relations can be cast, no way in 
which man can bring his physical and psychic ‘qualities’ into play without their 
being subjected increasingly to this reifying process (HCC, p. 100).  
In order to appreciate the philosophical character of this process, it is helpful to consider the German 
phrase Gegenständlichkeitsform [‘form of objectivity’] used by Lukács in describing perception 
within a ‘bourgeois-society’ controlled by the logic of commodity exchange.46 The term denotes a 
(neo-Kantian) conception that the perception of our objective reality is structured by subjective 
‘forms’. Rather than maintaining a tenet of German Idealism that these subjective forms or paradigms 
are determined by the individual mind, Lukács views these forms as socially and historically 
determined (in line with Hegel and Marx). Therefore, under the capitalist form of social organisation, 
experience arrives to us in the commodity form, as things to be traded, sold, or acquired. Yet this 
experience of the world is an impoverished one, incomplete and rife with contradiction.  
* 
The role of science and nature in HCC take a somewhat distinctive role as entities that lie outside the 
domain of social (and therefore dialectical) investigation. This marks a notable break from Engels, 
who formulated the application of Marx’s dialectical method to science and the natural world in 
works such as Anti-Dühring and the essays later collected in Dialectics of Nature.47 Lukács explains 
that the ‘crucial determinants of dialectics—the interaction of subject and object, the unity of theory 
and practice, the historical changes in the reality underlying the categories as the root cause of 
changes in thought etc.—are absent from our knowledge of nature’ (HCC, p. 24, fn6). Dialectical 
investigation is consequently designated to strictly social and historical realms.48 Which, in turn, is 
                                                          
46HCC, p. 83; See Andrew Feenberg, ‘Why Students of the Frankfurt School will have to read Lukács’, in The 
Palgrave Handbook of Critical Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p.113. 
47 Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring) (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart Limited, 1934 [1878]);  Dialectics of Nature (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976). 
48 Lukács follows Dilthey in the separation between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften in 
the original German edition (e.g. see HCC, p. 346). Although Lukács does not explicitly credit Dilthey despite 
mentioning him in both the text and revised preface in 1967, the separation in terms is reinforced by the 
separation in methodology; see Paul Burkett, ‘Lukács on Science: A new act in the tragedy’, Historical 
Materialism, 21, 3 (2013), 3-15. 
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largely considered a key conceptual structure for the theorists associated with the Frankfurt Institute 
for Social Research.  
However, to imply that the ‘knowledge of nature’ constituted as modern science holds a unique 
epistemological position compared to other modes of investigation creates a lasting contradiction. 
Rather, it may be more appropriate (and is largely implied throughout HCC) that the conception and 
study of nature should be designated to the social realm which in turn allows the knowledge of, and 
interaction with, nature to become reified.49 Accordingly, in a defence of HCC written a few years 
later—though unpublishable in the political climate and only resurfacing at the end of the century—
Lukács indeed forwards the position that, ‘Our consciousness of nature, in other words our knowledge 
of nature, is determined by our social being’.50 
Nonetheless, there remains a critique of science in HCC for its lack of social self-consciousness; 
asserting that the ‘more intricate a modern science becomes and the better it understands itself 
methodologically, the more resolutely it will turn its back on the ontological problems of its own 
sphere of influence and eliminate them from the realm where it has achieved some insight’ (Lukács, 
HCC, p. 104). Clearly, this represents a concern with the dogmatic assurance of method in the 
sciences, one that we will see shared by later Critical Theorists.  
Yet Lukács does not entirely abandon the objective focus of science, conveyed as the (imperceptible) 
material foundation upon which all sensation is grounded. Rather, without historical self-reflection 
science will find that ‘the world lying beyond its confines, and in particular the material base which it 
is its task to understand, its own concrete underlying reality lies, methodologically and in principle, 
beyond its grasp’ (HCC, p. 104, emphasis in original.).  
This complicates the notion that nature and Naturwissenschaften can be reduced to social behaviour 
without leaving a residue, and instead opts for a scientific view that incorporates historical and social 
requirements to look beyond what is immediately given in sense perception. In other words, even if 
there does exist an elusive material reality, one that remains consistent outside all human perception, 
and even if science represents the most accurate of all the fragmentary glimpses into a world 
unadorned with the baggage of subjectivity and history, there is no full untangling of scientific 
activity from human activity at large. The history of science itself, as well as political history, social 
                                                          
49 Vogel, Against Nature, ch.1 & 2.  
50 György Lukács, A Defence of History and Class Consciousness: Tailism and the Dialectic, trans. by E. Leslie 
(London: Verso, 2000), p. 100.  
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organisation, theology, literature, the arts, etc., are not supplements to objectivity, but fundamental in 
its establishment.  
This leads onto our central attention on scientific abstractions. A clear concern with scientific 
abstraction is invoked when Lukács asserts that: 
The specialisation of skills leads to the destruction of every image of the whole. And 
as, despite this, the need to grasp the whole—at least cognitively—cannot die out, we 
find that science, which is likewise based on specialisation and thus caught up in the 
same immediacy, is criticised for having torn the real world into shreds and having 
lost its vision of the whole (HCC, p. 103-04).  
However, it is maintained that it is not science that creates this splintered outlook on the world, but 
rather a larger, reified rationality in society reflected in the institutions of scientific discovery. 
Consequently, ‘The more highly developed [a modern science] becomes and the more scientific, the 
more it will become a formally closed system of partial laws’ (HCC, p. 104). Equating the institution 
of formal laws with the status of science itself here is reminiscent of the energeticists’ goal in unifying 
branches of modern sciences and delivering complete explanatory reduction. Lukács, however, 
refuses to reflect on the consequences of reification for the hard sciences, instead opting to critique the 
attempt of economics to replicate a formal science (something we will return to in §3).  
A more in-depth treatment of the development of rationality is undertaken by Lukács in ‘The 
Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought’. Principal in considering rationality is its ability to drastically 
change with the historical or material conditions of its emergence, and its given societal ‘role’. 
However, as Lukács claims, ‘What is novel about modern rationalism is its increasingly insistent 
claim that it has discovered the principle which connects up all phenomena which in nature and 
society are found to confront mankind. Compared with this, every previous type of rationalism is no 
more than a partial system’ (HCC, p. 113, emphasis in original). Again, we are reminded of the often-
explicit goal of the nascent modern physicists in searching for a unifying principle, one that ‘claims to 
be the universal method by which to obtain knowledge of the whole of existence’ (HCC, p. 114). The 
reification critique, therefore, implicitly reflects an anxiety with the universality of energy-rationality, 
and the hidden obligations with which it comes. 
Imitation of the natural sciences also acts as a contributing factor in the process of reification, both in 
the reduction of all phenomena to abstracted laws, as well as taking on the cold, calculating role of the 
experimenter in interpersonal relations: 
25 
 
What is important is to recognise clearly that all human relations (viewed as the 
objects of social activity) assume increasingly the objective forms of the abstract 
elements of the conceptual systems of natural science and of the abstract substrata of 
the laws of nature. And also, the subject of this ‘action’ likewise assumes 
increasingly the attitude of the pure observe [sic] of these—artificially abstract—
processes, the attitude of the experimenter (HCC, p. 131).  
* 
Now that we have traced within the original formulation of reification a potential critique of scientific 
abstractions, some proof is required that this indeed constitutes a useful ecological tool. Before 
investigating the damaging consequences of reifying abstractions, in this initial section it may prove 
useful to locate a critique of abstractions within the larger corpus of ecocritical theory. However, due 
to the sheer size of ecological theory and literature I do not intend to provide an overview of the 
discipline. Rather, a selection of ecocritical works are briefly sketched that are both paradigmatic of 
approaches and relevant to the current theory of abstractions.  
From the discussion of science in Lukács, and the reference to the fractured world outlook it 
implements, one may conclude that an argument towards a more ‘holistic’ outlook is being made, 
which in turn suggests an affinity with the deep ecology movement. Deep ecology, a broad movement 
largely centred around the work of Arne Naess, distinguishes itself from ‘shallow’ environmental 
movements that seek conservationist principles only so far as they may prevent damage to humans, 
and therefore remain fundamentally anthropocentric. The basic principles of deep ecology 
consequently locate an intrinsic value in the systems of life itself, as preservation of the ‘biosphere’ is 
viewed vital for its own sake rather than for the maintenance or growth of human life—consequently, 
human populations are considered too high and must decrease.51  
Indeed, the reified conscious could be diagnosed as an anthropocentric one. That is, a reified 
consciousness is one that only operates within the human-sphere (or perhaps only the patriarchal-
human-sphere) by taking a calculating stance that compresses all our surroundings and ourselves into 
commodifiable objects, and therefore ignores the intrinsic value these surroundings may hold for 
‘others’ (human or nonhuman).52 The solution Lukács offers relies on a return to the totality of 
                                                          
51 See, Arne Naess, The Selected Works of Arne Naess, Vol. 10: Deep Ecology of Wisdom, ed. by A. Drengson 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp33-55, for an outline of the ‘eight points’ of deep ecology. 
52 This is a similar notion of reification forwarded in Honneth, Reification, pp. 52-63. 
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existence, an argument that could easily fit into the into the structures of deep ecology—perhaps even 
adding a needed socio-political dimension to a largely ethical field. However, it is this 
(philosophically) idealistic tendency in Lukács that is most fervently rejected.53  Furthermore, 
although the reification critique is formulated here as an ecocritical theory of abstractions, the notion 
of un-abstracted thinking is not proposed as the alternative (even if, as may be the case, abstraction 
and ecology are considered antonyms). Whereas the solution to anthropocentric thinking in deep 
ecology is in switching to an ‘ecocentric’ stance, the harmful rule of abstractions cannot be solved 
merely by ‘seeing the bigger picture’; but rather, as we shall see, by reaching into the viscera of 
abstractions to discover what they compel us to hold onto.  
Social ecology, a movement often associated with Murray Bookchin, negates deep ecology by tracing 
the roots of ecological decimation into societal pathologies. The resolution of global warming, 
therefore, is a socio-political endeavour against the inequality inherent in capitalist production—yet 
ecological stability and sustainability is maintained as the foremost measurement of social change.54 
Again, the reification critique could fit quite naturally into the framework of a social ecology. As 
reification, itself induced by the social organisation of industrial capitalism, in turn induces an anti-
ecological stance towards the natural world. This is a perfectly reasonable interpretation and perhaps 
elucidates the influence of the Frankfurt School on Bookchin in its compatibility.55 However, such a 
reading largely equates reification with the psychological condition of commodification; and the 
tracing of a connection between commodification and ecological damage appears to be the academic 
equivalent of shooting fish in a barrel. The current reading of Lukács’s social theory is attempting to 
show how reification may operate beyond the realm of the individual, in making objects out of 
abstractions as a facet of the cultural impact of science. 
An approach which could inaccurately be considered a variation on social ecology, and closer to my 
own approach with its largely theoretical focus, are those who investigate the flawed idea of ‘nature’ 
found in western discourse and its resultant ecological damage. Soper and Vogel are examples who 
also engage with Frankfurt School literature in committing to this approach. Soper engages with the 
cultural conceptions of nature to delineate how the border between nature and society/culture has been 
drawn along political lines, and to make the implicit political assumptions in the term nature explicit. 
                                                          
53 See, Honneth, Reification, pp. 21-28. 
54 Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy, rev. ed. 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1991) 
55 Murray Bookchin, The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism, 2nd ed. (Montreal: 
Black Rose Books, 1996), p. ix.  
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Yet, she retains ‘a realist position as offering the only responsible basis from which to argue for any 
kind of political change’, and therefore upholds nature as an actual entity from which ethical practices 
can be derived.56 Vogel pushes this argument further toward the position of strong social-
constructivism, directly indebting himself to Lukács in an attempt to rid environmental philosophy of 
the term ‘nature’ altogether.57 An alternative and popular variant of the ‘nature-skeptic’ position is 
forwarded by Morton, who reaches a similar conclusion to Vogel through a critical engagement with 
nature writing, romantic poetry, and ‘first-wave’ ecocriticism itself.58 
These approaches indeed border on my own, as in many ways their engagement with nature could be 
viewed as assessing its appropriateness as an abstraction. Nature—as abstracting from an ambiguous 
range of phenomena ranging from trees, mountain vistas, yearly rainfall, to innate human violence—is 
reified into an object capable of operating well beyond its realm of application and with a certain 
ideological position. An idea of nature may be appealed to, for example in vetoing the implementation 
of wind turbines, in favour of oil dependence, in preserving the ‘untouched’ view of a landscape. 
Energy in its thermodynamic context is a more narrow and specific abstraction than nature, and is 
largely locatable within the realm of scientific literature (though early science fiction literature could 
figure heavily on the public opinion of energy59). However, I argue it can operate in the same vein 
even though it does not constitute a binary capable of deconstruction like nature and society, rather it 
necessitates the unpacking of its obligations to a specific outlook.  
Ecofeminism is a broad field, in some formulations compatible with deep or social ecology but with 
added reservations. As hinted towards above, the anthropocentric thinking problematic to deep 
ecology may be re-theorised as andropocentric. Alternatively, the societal domination instituting the 
root problem in social ecology may be specified as an inherently patriarchal form of domination. The 
approaches of ecofeminism, however, are highly manifold. 
                                                          
56 Soper, p. 8. 
57 Vogel, Thinking like a Mall, see ch.2. For a sustained constructivist reading of Lukács and the Frankfurt 
School, see Vogel’s Against Nature.   
58 Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
59 Such as the short story Goliah by popular author Jack London in 1906 about an anonymous, neo-Hobbesian 
figure who institutes a socialist utopia through a mysterious weapon named Energon, ‘nothing more nor less 
than the cosmic energy that resides in the solar rays’; Jack London, The Complete Short Stories of Jack London, 
ed. by E. Labor, R. C. Leitz, and I. M. Shepard (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 1216. Goliah is 
an early and model example of the twin public conception of ‘mechanical energy’, as something that may bring 
unprecedented destruction and simultaneously a paradise to humanity.  
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Exemplary of an early ecofeminist approach to the cultural impact of science is Carolyn Merchant’s 
The Death of Nature.60 Merchant’s text provides a historical account of how the development of 
modern science has resulted in the subjugation of nature and women. Asserting the need to review 
male theorists such as Descartes and Francis Bacon, she writes;   
In investigating the roots of our current environmental dilemma and its connections 
to science, technology, and the economy, we must re-examine the formation of a 
world view and a science that, by reconceptualising reality as a machine rather than a 
living organism, sanctioned the domination of both nature and women (Merchant, p. 
xxi).  
Merchant’s chapter on Francis Bacon, for example, is an exposition into how Bacon’s ‘new ethic’ 
served to further an idea of progress tied to a patriarchal structure of state and family, as well as to the 
overall benefit of the nascent middle classes. This is evidenced by an inspection on Bacon’s New 
Atlantis (1627), in which the conception of a utopian society exposes the underlying patriarchal 
assumptions behind the goals of the scientific revolution’s control over nature: ‘Bacon’s Bensalem in 
the New Atlantis illustrated a patriarchal family structure in which the “Father” exercised authority 
over the kin and the role of the woman had been reduced to near invisibility’ (Merchant, p, 173).  
Merchant’s appraisal of patriarchal science concludes with the holism of J.C. Smuts (a complicated 
figure, as a philosopher and South African war general in the apartheid era) as a proposed solution. As 
stated, the current approach does not wish to endorse holism, per se, as the solution to abstraction. The 
role of a patriarchal influence in the theorising of energy is not explored here, nor is the larger notion 
that abstractions are decidedly gendered. However, an (eco)feminist analysis could prove vital in 
assessing the cultural prioritising of certain scientific abstractions, as well as the feminist analysis of 
the scientific process itself in reference to ‘situated knowledge.61  
                                                          
60 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution, rev. ed. (New York: 
HarperOne, 1990). 
61 Important examples include: Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific 
Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). C.f. Donna Haraway, ‘Situated knowledges: The science 
question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective’, Feminist studies, 14, 3 (1988), 575-99. Stacy 
Alaimo, Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2000), provides a solid example of an ecofeminist redefinition of the association between women and nature. 
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1.3 EnergeticsValueReification 
Two years after the original publication of History and Class Consciousness, the English philosopher 
A. N. Whitehead conceived of a similar phenomenon to reification termed the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness.62 The fallacy dictates a propensity to make abstract ideas into concrete entities. This 
misplaced concreteness occurred particularly in the science and philosophy of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Yet its effects, according to Whitehead, ran deeply into the intellectual outlook 
of the early twentieth century, only occasionally revealing itself through obfuscated symptoms, such 
as in the unending debates around the mind-body problem.  
Does the (seemingly independent) emergence of the concept of reification and the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness say something about a shared ‘intellectual ontology’ of the 1920s? An era 
largely dominated by the scientific outlook of physics, inspired by the emergence of the energy 
concept in the mid- to late- nineteenth century and its transition into nuclear territories, bringing with 
it visions of energy-abundant futures. Whitehead more likely had a firmer grasp of this transition, and 
certainly his work was more informed by the history and philosophy of science than Lukács’s. 
However, Lukácsian reification can also be viewed as both a cause and consequence of nineteenth 
century physics, specifically the energy concept—a worldview that pervades our conception of fuel, 
our environment, and the capacity of our own bodies. 
As we have seen, in the 19th century the incipient scientist found themselves in need of a binding 
agent able to hold together progressively fracturing fields of investigation.63 Energy, therefore, 
emerged as a (meta)physical consistency, flexible enough to provide a foundational scientific 
cosmology. Consequently, the conservation of energy that swept the scientific community and general 
public’s cosmological outlook was rooted in this desire for unification and tethered to the possibility 
of complete explanatory reduction.  
Reification, in turn, can only exist as a valuable theory in this liminal space between realism and 
distortion. That is, between the acceptance of energy as existing in the world—as real as the 
observable phenomena that it underlies (i.e. against a bifurcation of nature in Whiteheadian terms)—
and the ways in which energy becomes a concept through which we understand the world that we live 
in, organise practices and intuitions, and justify social circumstances. Essentially, in an ecocritical 
                                                          
62 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp. 64-92. 
63 For a history of the term ‘Scientist’ and its origins in unifying practices of physics, mathematics, chemistry, 
etc. in Victorian Britain, see Sydney Ross, ‘Scientist: The story of a word’ Annals of science, 18, 2 (1962), 65-
85. 
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theory of abstractions, abstractions are real and causal agents; it is the assumption that abstractions are 
not real and causal agents, and are therefore politically neutral, that allows for their hijacking. (At the 
risk of sounding over-speculative, abstractions are ‘emergent structures’). Subsequently, an ecocritical 
theory of abstractions should, as Stengers also notes, no longer attempt to ‘ “civilise” our abstractions, 
to separate them from their polemical power, but to transform them’.64 
Therefore, the concept of energy itself is not a ‘reification’, neither is its acceptance as an objective 
feature of the universe. Rather, through investigating the history of the energy-concept we witness 
how societal practices culminate in the construction of concepts that morph and become influenced by 
‘internal’ factors (within the field of physics, for example) and ‘external’ factors, such as the political 
organisations of industrial capitalism that revolve around energy production and consumption. The 
abstraction (energy) that emerges obliges us to its outlook; mechanisation, engines, unification, etc. 
The goal of an ecocritical theory of abstractions should be to ‘transform’ the obligations of energy in 
response to a warming planet.  
At the turn of the 20th century, figures such as Wilhelm Ostwald were taking the establishment of the 
conservation of energy to initiate new schools of empiricism. This new ‘school of energetics’ looked 
at society and psychology as ultimately reducible to energy transfers, with ‘value’ being derived from 
efficiency in the process.65  
Whitehead and Lukács, on the other hand, can be seen as (independently) posing theoretical 
alternatives to the fruition of a world conceivable in energy transactions. In their respective systems, 
the material realisation unfolding from energy in flux, i.e. the physical world around us, means that 
the subject finds themselves in the midst of continuing processes; yet may find this process obscured 
by the social practices of everyday life. For Lukács specifically, these ‘social practices’ both originate 
from, and maintain, the commodity exchange so prevalent in the process of modernisation—
simultaneously justifying political systems that prevent social justice and a communist revolution. 
                                                          
64 Stengers, Thinking with Whitehead, p.113. 
65 Janet Stewart, ‘Sociology, Culture and Energy: The case of Wilhelm Ostwald’s “Sociological Energetics”–a 
translation and exposition of a classic text’, Cultural Sociology, 8, 3 (2014), 333-350. The sociology of Ostwald, 
however, did not gain much traction, seemingly because of its almost brutal refusal by the most influential name 
in German sociology, Max Weber (another possible link between Lukács and the energeticists). On Weber and 
Ostwald, see Mark Mikkelson ‘Translator’s Note to “‘Energetic’ Theories of Culture” by Max Weber’, Mid-
American Review of Sociology, 9, 2 (1984), 27-31; Max Weber, Mark Mikkelsen, and Charles Schwartz, 
‘“Energetic” Theories of Culture’, Mid-American Review of Sociology 9, 2 (1984 [1909]), 33-58. There are 
interesting parallels between this energeticist approach and the theory of society forwarded by George Bataille: 
Allan Stoekl, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2007). 
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Taking or leaving the specifics of Lukács, we can conclude from him that transforming abstractions is 
not merely an intellectual endeavour, but concurrently political; in the following sections we will turn 
to other tracts of Critical Theory in expanding this.  
The refusal to bifurcate nature, to completely discard the qualitative in the process of a reduction to 
energy, is key. We can observe this in the commercial distribution of energy itself, as Smil notes, 
‘Two kinds of coal may have an identical energy density, but one may burn very cleanly and leave 
behind only a small amount of ash, while the other may smoke heavily, emit a great deal of sulfur 
dioxide, and leave a large incombustible residue.’66 The separation of energy and production in vast 
areas of western society allows for this form of qualitative difference to remain unimposing—as the 
meter shows kWh’s, the lightbulb shines just as bright, the kettle boils just as fast, etc. The almost 
constant use of energy in our lives becomes an object in its own right, severed from the potentially 
dirty fuel that provides it, and the static feeling of our energy rich environment clouds the lens from 
which we view the world.  
One may question how this argument is distinct from a holistic approach rejected above. Its 
divergence lies in refuting the prioritisation of the ‘sum of the parts’—that the part can only be 
understood in the context of its whole domain—that remains inherent in the holistic approach and the 
deep ecology that runs out of it. This is partly because of a mistrust in the ability to pinpoint where a 
‘sum’ exists, historically being employed without discomfort in the service of (eco)fascism.67 Also 
because holism ignores that, as Morton puts it, ‘it’s all parts, all the way up and all the way down, so 
that a “higher level” (say, the relative height of trees in a forest) maps onto “lower” levels (say, the 
relative width of branches in a single tree)’; that is, it is not a possibility to escape the abstraction as a 
holistic position wishes to present us, but instead it is essential to map their interactions and 
obligations. 68  
* 
                                                          
66 Vaclav Smil, Energy and Civilisation: A History (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), p.17. 
67 For the fascist co-option of holism, see, for example, David Cooper, ‘Verstehen, Holism and Fascism’, Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 41 (1996), 95-107. Lukács also pointed towards this in his expansive book 
The Destruction of Reason, trans. by P. Palmer (London: Merlin Press, 1980 [1953]), ch.4. 
68 Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 106. The current 
is an approach inspired by an ecology of practices; see Isabelle Stengers, ‘Introductory Notes on an Ecology of 
Practices’, Cultural Studies Review, 11, 1 (2005), 183-96. 
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The connections between reification and energy are also expressed in parallel through their implicit 
reference to value. Simmel, for example, used the analogy of energy exchange in the physical realm in 
analysing the exchange of money in the Philosophy of Money.69 Doubtless this connection could be 
meticulously traced into Lukács’ formulations, but it may prove somewhat superfluous to do so: 
Wealth and energy have been equally influential (and reified) in their analogous entwinement with 
one other.70  
A more meaningful connection is the metamorphosis of value that occurs with this analogy to the 
laws of energy conservation. This is especially important when considering that Marx’s work 
expounding his often-called ‘labour theory of value’ is occurring precisely within this period of 
transformation. However, again, to attempt to derive Marx’s precise position on the conservation of 
energy would be somewhat out of the purview of this essay, as well as appraising his disagreement 
with Podolinsky who attempted to synthesise a Marxist economic system with thermodynamics.71 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the value metaphor that weaves throughout the first volume of 
Capital is one stuck between a caloric and mechanical theory. 72 The caloric/aether metaphor views 
value as a substance that flows from labour to other empty vases—commodities: ‘As values, all 
commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour-time’.73 This is contrasted with a view of 
labour as analogous to mechanical energy, as taking equivalence in the value generated in 
commodities. Yet Marx also wants to retain a qualitative value in the contextual manifestation of 
labour, the human being that enacts it, their beliefs and social practices that ordain it. We are flung 
back into the thoughts of Caleb Garth, who locates value in the process of labour itself rather than in 
the production of its output. Therefore, an ecological approach to Marx should be one that scrutinises 
                                                          
69 Stewart, p. 336.  
70 ‘Abstraction or not, energy is as real as wealth—I am not sure that they are not two aspects of the same thing. 
The one drives the commercial and industrial activities of men, and the other the whole physical activities of the 
entire universe’; Frederick Soddy, Science and Life: Aberdeen Addresses (London: Murray, 1920), p. 28.  
71 Martínez Alier, and José Naredo, ‘A Marxist Precursor of Energy Economics: Podolinsky’ The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 9, 2 (1982), 207-224; c.f., Paul Burkett, and John Bellamy Foster, ‘Metabolism, Energy, and 
Entropy in Marx's Critique of Political Economy: Beyond the Podolinsky myth’, Theory and Society, 35, 1 
(2006), 109-156. 
72 Mirowski has outlined this possibility of conflicting value theories relating to heat theories; and distinguishes 
between a ‘crystallised’ labour theory of value (which possesses a strong conservation principle, remaining 
constant regardless of the market conditions), and a ‘real-cost’ labour theory of value, which is subject to the 
conditions of the market; Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as 
Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 174-185. 
73 Marx, p. 130. 
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labour as an abstraction, and indeed ‘green’ evaluations of Marx often criticise the prioritisation of 
labour for its inability to account for ‘nature’ or conservation.74 
The similarities between Whitehead and Lukács also figure here, as they both suggest potentially 
important consequences in considering value as a substance or as a process. Whitehead’s 
metaphysical system quite explicitly (although intricately and in a way largely avoidant of summary) 
rejects a substance view of the world towards that of process. Lukács, in turn, rejects the substance 
view of society for a procedural approach, a society ‘constituted by fluid interactions between human 
beings at work and in the reproduction of their lives’.75 This implies that, to Lukács, society is 
thermodynamic (or perhaps valuedynamic), despite the rationalism of industrial capitalism that 
encourages its perception as something fixed and static: Where society becomes valued as the field in 
which commodities are produced and consumed, and nature (or an idea of it) becomes valued as the 
area not subsumed into society, clear landscapes and ‘wilderness’. However, in a response to global 
warming this fixed account of value must be disrupted and made multifaceted in the deconstruction of 
a nature-society divide.76 
Therefore, as we meditate on that ‘myriad-headed, myriad-handed’ thing energy, one wonders 
whether we must also still hear the ‘roar of the furnace’ or ‘the thunder and plash of the engine’ as 
necessary accompaniments to the energetic worldview. Or whether, as old values melt away, the 
practices inspired by the energy concept may become more multiple.  
 
  
                                                          
74 See Huber, ‘Value, Nature, and Labor’. 
75 Feenberg, p111. 
76 See Morton, Ecology Without Nature.  
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Section 2: Abstraction and Enlightenment 
Section 1 has gone some way as to outline an ecocritical theory of abstractions. By an ecocritical 
theory of abstractions we mean an approach to culturally dominant (scientific) abstractions that 
engages with their historical and philosophical conditions of emergence in order to discover some of 
the underlying assumptions we may be obligated in when accepting the abstraction as a real entity in 
the world. We do not, however, wish to contend that abstractive thought must be reined in, or 
abolished, as an argument for holism and deep ecology would contend. Instead it is in the scrutinising 
of abstractions and their subsequent fluidity, as well as in the mapping of their connections and 
contradictions, that a decidedly ecological facet of this approach comes to the fore.  
Reification and energy are both essential in this view rather than constituting mere examples. 
Assessing their interrelation has uncovered a responsive concern with the politics of abstraction, made 
explicit in Whitehead, yet brought into the realm of social organisation in the work of Lukács. 
However, so far little proof has been given that this approach could function as a critical 
methodology.  
This second section will move forward in its route along the formulations of reification, onto the 
celebrated Critical Theory of Adorno and Horkheimer. In a selection of their co-authored and 
independent works, we find a pre-existing ecological critique that engages much more explicitly with 
abstraction and implicitly with reification; this will be explored and delineated.  
Following this, a closer engagement with the methodological feature of Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
theory of reification (their refutation of positivism) will be carried out through a cursory study of the 
conservation of energy as theorised by Ernst Mach and Max Planck, and speculating on some 
potential consequences of their ‘opposing’ views.  
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2.1 From Dialectics to Ecology. 
Presently the dry wood sent out a flame which illuminated every crevice, and Mary 
saw that the old man was lying quietly with his head turned a little on one side. She 
went towards him with inaudible steps, and thought that his face looked strangely 
motionless; but the next moment the movement of the flame communicating itself to 
all objects made her uncertain. The violent beating of her heart rendered her 
perceptions so doubtful that even when she touched him and listened for his 
breathing, she could not trust her conclusions. She went to the window and gently 
propped aside the curtain and blind, so that the still light of the sky fell on the bed.  
—Middlemarch.77 
Beneath the carving drag of wood 
the land moves slowly. 
But lightning comes. 
— Audre Lorde, ‘Oaxaca’, in Coal.78  
The themes employed in the 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment (DoE) embody a transition from the 
conservationist principles of Romanticism’s appeal to nature, with its counterpart in the anti-
Enlightenment philosophy of the nineteenth century, to a more expressly political project calling for 
near complete social transformation.79 In attempting to diagnose the societal conditions that led to the 
spiralling emergence of fascism and oppressive capitalism, Adorno and Horkheimer collectively 
conceived of a speculative anthropology, one that poetically extols their respective concerns with 
mainstream culture and academic scientism. The exploratory text would assert itself as a centre-piece 
of ‘Frankfurt School’ thought; and with its impact in the emergence of social theory more generally, it 
can be seen as decisive to the ecocritical movement that would partially succeed it.  
The relevance of the Dialectic in an ecological discourse is largely self-evident: ‘What men want to 
learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men’ (DoE, p. 4) writes 
                                                          
77 Eliot, p.354. 
78 Audre Lorde, Coal (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 10. 
79 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by J. Cumming (London: Verso, 
1997); abbreviated to DoE. For the similarities and distinctions between Marxist and Romantic critiques of 
modern society, see Micheal Löwy, ‘The Romantic and the Marxist Critique of Modern Civilization’, Theory 
and Society, 16, 6 (1987), 891-904. 
 
36 
 
Horkheimer, early in the chapter that defines the concept of enlightenment.80 In doing so, he 
unabashedly explicates a plurality of claims on what nature is, how it manifests, and the fundamental 
role it plays is social organisation. The rest of the book, it could be said, aims at the dissection and 
reanimation of this statement. 
The qualification for this process of domination comes with the swirling, dense style the Dialectic is 
famous for—a style called for in the denial of ‘any allegiance to current linguistic and conceptual 
conventions’, due to there no longer being ‘any available form of linguistic expression which has not 
tended toward accommodation to dominant currents of thought’ (DoE, p. xii). Perhaps a thorough 
reaction against the corruption of the German language under National Socialism, the Lingua Tertii 
Imperii.81 Or perhaps more generally a preliminary argument about the entwinement of language and 
instrumental reason in reproducing complete technical domination. Regardless, greater lucidity can be 
gathered from analysing the chronology dotted throughout the text: 
Pre-enlightenment, there exists a conflict between the individual and the sum of their surroundings 
that reveals itself through the endowment of supernatural status to the hidden and complex material 
networks that make up any given environment: 82  
Everything unknown and alien is primary and undifferentiated: that which transcends 
the confines of experience; whatever in things is more than their previously known 
reality. What the primitive experiences as supernatural is not spiritual, in contrast to 
material, substance; but the interwoven nexus of the Natural in contrast to the 
singular twine. The gasp of surprise which accompanies the experience of the 
unusual becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to 
the known, and therefore terror as sacredness. The dualization of nature as 
appearance and sequence, effort and power, which first makes possible both myth 
                                                          
80 Habermas, with confirmation from Gretel Adorno, claims that Horkheimer primarily wrote ‘The Concept of 
Enlightenment’ and ‘Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality’; and Adorno ‘Odysseus or Myth and 
Enlightenment’ and ‘The Culture Industry’ chapters. I will follow this claim for my own purposes. See Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘Remarks on the Development of Horkheimer’s Work’, in On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives, 
ed. by S. Benhabib, W. Bonss, and J. McCole (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 57.  
81 Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI, Lingua Terii Imperii: A Philologist’s Notebook, 
trans. by M. Brady (London: Athlone, 2000). 
82 Note that the concept, enlightenment, differs from the historical epoch and associated philosophers, the 
Enlightenment. Therefore, pre-enlightenment here is more analogous to ‘pre-civilisation’ than it is to ‘before 
1637’. 
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and science, originates in human fear, the expression of which becomes explanation. 
(DoE, 15; translation modified83) 
Incipient abstraction, therefore, arises through an interaction between a vibrant nature and the 
construction of ‘knowledge’ at the dawn of civilisation. Here society is not organised by nature 
directly, as a vulgar materialism would posit, but rather becomes organised through an interpretive 
relationship between human knowledge and material nature. What is first taken to be a supernatural 
entity is not any sort of incorporeal essence, rather it is the inability to observe the entire entwinement 
(Verschlungenheit) of causal chains that make up the natural world, when observing—abstracting 
from—a single link (Glied) of that network.  
The experience of nature is, therefore, as Caliban bemoans in The Tempest, an isle ‘full…of noises’.84 
But not one of ‘Sounds and sweet airs, that give delight and hurt not’—but rather one of a hectic 
calamity: 
All the infections that the sun sucks up 
From bogs, fens, flats, on Prosper fall and make him 
By inch-meal a disease! His spirits hear me 
And yet I needs must curse. But they'll nor pinch, 
Fright me with urchin—shows, pitch me i' the mire, 
Nor lead me, like a firebrand, in the dark 
Out of my way, unless he bid 'em; but 
For every trifle are they set upon me; 
Sometime like apes that mow and chatter at me 
And after bite me, then like hedgehogs which 
Lie tumbling in my barefoot way and mount 
Their pricks at my footfall; sometime am I 
All wound with adders who with cloven tongues 
                                                          
83 ‚Was der Primitive dabei als übernatürlich erfährt, ist keine geistige Substanz als Gegensatz zur materiellen, 
sondern die Verschlungenheit des Natürlichen gegenüber dem einzelnen Glied‘. Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch, 
1988), p. 21. It is worth mentioning here that Cumming’s translation splits opinion; Vogel, for example, quite 
heavily scorns it, whereas Jameson praises it. See; Vogel, Against Nature, p.184; Fredric Jameson, Late 
Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990), pp. ix-x.  
84 The Tempest, Act III, Scene II, in William Shakespeare, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ed. by 
W. J. Craig (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 10. 
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Do hiss me into madness.85 
Culture, in the broad sense employed in the Dialectic, is the manifestation of a psychological need to 
suppress the fear induced by confrontation with the complexity of nature. In early human society, 
culture is entirely mythical.86 Myth attempts, as rationality will, to reduce fear through the process of 
knowing: ‘Like science, magic pursues aims, but seeks to achieve them by mimesis—not by 
progressively distancing itself from the object’ (DoE, p. 11). The mythic hegemony in culture is 
therefore suffused with animism. However, with myth comes the strict hierarchy that would reach its 
zenith in tribal society, in some way itself mimetic of later feudal/absolutist rule. This hierarchy 
would stimulate a new form of self-preservation, in turn instigating reason in the need to disrupt and 
break down oppression. Conceptual-enlightenment, the expression of this emerging reason, therefore 
attempts to overcome fear for the same purpose as myth while employing its negation as a 
methodology: ‘Man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown. That 
determines the course of demythologization, of enlightenment, which compounds the animate with 
the inanimate just as myth compounds the inanimate with the animate. Enlightenment is mythic fear 
turned radical’ (DoE, p. 16). 
‘The disenchantment of the world is the extirpation of animism’ (DoE, p. 5), which constitutes the 
primary tool of enlightenment. This process manifests in philosophy from the time of Xenophanes 
(who died 475BC) to the tropes of the early Analytic school of Russel and Wittgenstein—qua 
emblematic of the ‘positivism’ Horkheimer abhors.87 Yet the rationality that disenchants animism also 
shapes a re-construction of the world, one that reflects its own reductive image: ‘The subjective spirit 
which cancels the animation of nature can master a despiritualized nature only by imitating its rigidity 
and despiritualizing itself in turn’ (DoE, p. 57). 
However, this demythologization also contains the potential seed of enlightenment’s demise and 
subsequent return to myth:  
                                                          
85 The Tempest, Act II, Scene II; Shakespeare, p. 14. 
86 Of course, this is an anachronistic use of the term myth, even by the standards of Adorno and Horkheimer. 
Myth can only thus be conceived as so if it stands at odds to the reason of enlightenment. As enlightenment 
comes from myth, it is clear that these two concepts are very much co-dependant. The deconstruction of myth 
and enlightenment forms a swelling undertone of the Dialectic.  
87 Generally, positivism refers a philosophical position in epistemology starting in the Positivist movement 
founded by Aguste Comte. Positivism stipulates the advancement of assured knowledge is exclusively derived 
from empirical observation, refined through reason and logic. However, this discussion confronts a discrepancy 
between Horkheimer’s conception of positivism, and the beliefs of theorists commonly referred to as Positivists. 
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Mythology itself set off the unending process of enlightenment in which ever and 
again, with the inevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic view succumbs to 
the destructive criticism that it is only a belief—until even the very notions of spirit, 
of truth and, indeed, enlightenment itself, have become animistic magic. (DoE, p. 11) 
 A potentially grim and pessimistic vision; as enlightenment attempts liberation from mythic-society 
and its corresponding hierarchy imposed from religious/spiritual leaders, the only effective process it 
can engage in is the destruction of all mythical connections to nature through rational abstraction. 
Thus, while enlightenment attempts to establish itself as separate from myth, its motivation for 
emancipation ultimately cannot justify itself in the reductive process of emancipation. Therefore, 
enlightenment itself only temporarily or superficially escapes the fate of extirpation—rationality 
ultimately leads back to hierarchy.  
Accordingly, the process of enlightenment is the process of abstraction we have outlined; yet one that 
repeatedly prioritises itself to the destruction of its predecessor, until the emancipatory intent of its 
inception is also expelled. As the authors preface, enlightenment must ‘accommodate reflection on 
this recidivist element’, else it will ‘seal its own fate’ (DoE, p. xiii). This could be, and most 
straightforwardly is, read as an argument for a more holistic approach to nature. However, our attempt 
to resist the pull of holism instead directs us to the mapping of incompatible practices engaged with 
the environment around us—very broadly scientific and moral practices. Moral assertions such as 
those to social justice arise out of history, somatic experience, and claims to representation; whereas 
scientific confronts nature with the aim of a unified explanation. Moral life is also one resistant to 
translation into a unitary mode, but naturally exists as a multiplicity (see fig. 2).  
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Figure 2; William Blake’s depiction of Urizen from The First Book of Urizen. Urizen, the 
representation of abstractions, god of reason and logic who rules over the Enlightenment, brings 
humanity into misery through uniformity: 
It is Urizen. But unknown, abstracted, 
 Brooding, secret, the dark Power hid. 
 2. Times on times he divided, and measur'd  
Space by space in his ninefold darkness,88 
                                                          
88 William Blake, The First Book of Urizen, Copy A (London, 1794), p. 5. Image: Blake, The First Book of 
Urizen, p. 24; retrieved <http://www.blakearchive.org/copy/urizen.a> [accessed 25 September 2019]. 
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* 
Horkheimer’s chapter, ‘The Concept of Enlightenment’, inherits an overt concern with the 
methodology of science and epistemology, especially positivism, as expounded in his other key texts. 
The concern with positivism in Dialectic of Enlightenment is instantly evinced by the critique of 
Francis Bacon, a key Enlightenment reformer and ancestral figurehead of Horkheimer’s positivism. 
Bacon is charged with leading the reductive, quantitative exclusivity of scientific method, as well as 
the encouragement of technical domination over nature in order to re-enter paradise following the 
Fall: ‘Bacon’s view was appropriate to the scientific attitude that prevailed after him. The 
concordance between the mind of man and the nature of things that he had in mind is patriarchal: the 
human mind, which overcomes superstition, is to hold sway over a disenchanted nature’ (DoE, p. 4).89 
Horkheimer initiates this concern with methodology and positivism in his 1937 delineation of Critical 
Theory, as opposed to ‘Traditional Theory’.90 Critical Theory attempts to solve the ‘present crisis’; 
being both the inherent contradictions between a liberal society that treasures an ideal of 
individualism and liberty, while concentrating the majority of power and resources into an ever-
smaller percentage of massive corporations (CT, p. xi); as well  ‘the incapacity of individual 
disciplines to give an epitome of the whole of actuality, providing instead only partial cognitions 
which are without relations to the whole of our existence’.91 
These seemingly disparate crises both employ the exploitation of a purported rational thinking, such 
as science, in the justification of a pre-established order.92 The social institution of science is invoked 
by systems maintaining unfair wealth distribution due to its ability to reflect contemporary society in a 
universal light, while also providing technological advances that benefit people. It is precisely the 
beneficial technological advances science brings that grants it such influence as a cultural institution. 
                                                          
89 Bacon has been the centre of subsequent ecological and postcolonial critiques: See e.g., Merchant, ch.7. 
However, Bacon’s position as a historical figure has been complicated e.g. by those who indicate in him a 
trepidation towards colonialism; see Sarah Irving, ‘ “In a Pure Soil”: Colonial anxieties in the work of Francis 
Bacon’, History of European Ideas, 32, 3 (2006) 249-62. 
90 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. by M. O’Connel (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1972); abbreviated to CT.  
91 Translated in Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998) p248, fn4. This 
latter formulation is the similar to the crisis found in Lukács above and Husserl; Edmond Husserl, 
Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, tans. by D. Carr (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970 [1936]). 
92 A project not dissimilar to Rousseau’s first discourse, ‘Discourse on the Sciences and Arts’; Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Basic Political Writings, ed. by D. A. Cress and D. Wootton (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2012), pp.1-26. 
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Consequently, the sources of systemic injustice can become obscured by ‘precisely those forces which 
are working for the betterment of the human situation’ (CT, p. 4).  
This stance is not anti-scientific, nor does it dispute the claims of modern science. The fact that the 
process outlined in the Dialectic of Enlightenment extends to well before the establishment of modern 
science is crucial in pointing out that the cultural privileging of reduction is one unrelated to the 
‘accuracy’ of the findings it privileges. Positivism is therefore framed in a long line of theories that 
mistakenly privileges reduction as the only legitimate form of knowledge: ‘To the Enlightenment, that 
which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; modern positivism 
writes it off as literature’ (DoE, p. 7).93 
This conflict with positivism would reach its zenith in the Positivismusstreit, a debate around the 
methodology of sociology occurring primarily between the Frankfurt School and other more 
empirically minded institutions.94 However, the general critique was already very much present in the 
initial delineation of Critical Theory, viz. Critical Theory emphasises a heightened awareness to the 
historical impacts that continuously influence the (social or natural) scientist in their decisions, despite 
a feeling of immanent presence and objectivity in the investigation (CT, p. 195). It therefore identifies 
attempts to dismiss politically or historically informed accounts for ones that ‘merely states the facts’ 
as possible moves in justifying the liberal (or fascist) political dogma. Consequently, Critical Theory 
keeps only one primary influence as the object of research, a ‘concern for the abolition of social 
injustice’ (CT, p. 242). 
We can observe in the delineation of Critical Theory, therefore, the transformation of abstractions 
under the guidance of abolishing social injustice. This acts in response to those who view abstractions 
as ahistorical and apolitical entities. 
Unfortunately, the opposition of this overly rigid, ossified thinking has often opted to abandon science 
entirely by habitually exposing its inherent historicity or the oppressiveness of 
                                                          
93 ‘For number is just that completely quiescent, lifeless, and indifferent determinateness in which all movement 
and relation is extinguished, and which has broken the bridge to the living element of instincts, manner of life, 
and other aspects of sensuous existence’; Georg W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p.172. 
94 See Marius Strubenhoff, ‘The Positivism Dispute in German Sociology, 1954–1970’, History of European 
Ideas, 44, 2 (2018), 260-76. 
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objectivity/universality.95 As Stengers notes, ‘Criticizing science’s claim that nature can be discovered 
and described as independent of the perceiving mind or human language or culture, or as a mirror of 
nature, has been an easy sport for many philosophers since Kant’;96 a much more difficult task is 
mapping the obligations of a scientific outlook that allows for a legitimate exchange of ideas without 
devolving into scientism or dismissal, yet measures the boundaries of sciences compossibility with 
other outlooks. This is an aim of Stengers’s ecology of practices and, concurrently, our ecocritical 
theory of abstractions.  
* 
Adorno’s succeeding fragment in the Dialectic of Enlightenment explores underlying psychodynamic 
mechanisms that operate in abstractive thought, as exemplified through his literary analysis of 
Homer’s Odyssey. Adorno sees Odysseus as proto-bourgeois in that he undermines, and therefore 
destroys, the myth of his surroundings through the use of regulative reason—derived from knowing 
the inner workings of myth itself (DoE, p. 44). In other words, Odysseus uses a form of cunning to 
deceive myth, thereby bypassing its adherence and so benefitting himself.  In this way, enlightenment 
emerges from the psychological need for self-preservation, and the use of sacrifice as a form of 
deception.  
‘Something of this trickery, which elevates the frail individual to the status of a vehicle of divine 
substance, has always been apparent in the ego—which owes its existence to the sacrifice of the 
present moment to the future’ (DoE, p. 51). Here the image of Odysseus strapped to the mast becomes 
obliging. The sirens’ song, with its irresistible alluring quality, ultimately dooms the sailors by 
drawing them onto the rocks. In the effort of self-preservation, Odysseus allows himself to hear the 
song, but restrains himself by being tied to the mast of the ship. When Odysseus comes in range of the 
song, his volition becomes undone, he wishes to give in to immediacy and follow the sound; the 
aesthetic splendour of nature. He calls out to his crew, their ears filled with wax, to follow his 
renewed orders. But in vain. They have been informed to ignore him until he no longer reacts to the 
                                                          
95 C.f. Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, who gives a witty account of the temptation in a feminist philosophy of 
science—with the emergence of strong social constructivism in scientific realms—to dispel all claims to 
objectivity and science as such:  
We unmasked the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our budding sense of 
collective historical subjectivity and agency and our ‘embodied’ accounts of the truth, and we 
ended up with one more excuse for not learning any post-Newtonian physics and one more 
reason to drop the old feminist self-help practices of repairing our own cars. They're just texts 
anyway, so let the boys have them back (Haraway, p. 578). 
96 Isabelle Stengers, ‘A Constructivist Reading of Process and Reality’, Theory, Culture & Society, 25, 4 (2008), 
91-110 (p. 93).  
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melody. His cunning, under allegiance to self-preservation, has outdone his desire for immediacy. He 
survives, and in so doing institutes sacrifice as the foundation of bourgeois rational reasoning.  
Conceptual-enlightenment is partly constituted by this process of repression and self-alienation 
through cunning. Adorno’s vision of humanity is one constantly beckoned by the ‘nature’ with which 
it was once unified. Abstractive thought, as the ‘distancing’ of the subject from the object through its 
reduction, represents the severing of this connection for the sake of survival. In this sense abstractive 
thinking is the foundation of instrumental reason, as in order to manipulate and control one’s 
surroundings first they must be able to isolate the causal factors at play. However, for our current 
purposes Adorno’s critique of abstractive thought represents a problematic appeal to a holistic and 
prior state of unity with nature, as reliant on the nature-society divide and the possibility of a non-
abstractive thinking.  
Adorno expands upon this notion of abstraction in his most explicitly philosophical work, Negative 
Dialectics.97 In a negative dialectic, new attention is given to the way objects elude our conception of 
them. Objects, it is posited, are always more than the sum of their abstracted concepts; that is, they 
‘do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder’ (ND, p. 5). ‘Identity’ is Adorno’s term for 
those features picked out from a perceived object necessary for it to be conceived of in thought. Other 
information about the particular that does not cooperate with our conception of them, the 
‘nonidentity’, is ignored. This nonidentity has been categorically overlooked by the philosophical 
tradition, and therefore Adorno wishes to focus on hitherto unattended ‘nonconceptuality, 
individuality, and particularity—things which ever since Plato used to be dismissed as transitory and 
insignificant, and which Hegel labelled “Lazy Existenz” ’ (ND, p. 8).  
Thus, as with our current approach, ND postulates that abstraction is required for the establishment 
and transmission of all concepts. The problem lies in mistaking the concept of an object for the object 
itself, i.e. giving primacy to the subject. Adorno sees this as present in early human self-reflection, 
and given gravitas by philosophic traditions from the Socratics to the German Idealists and beyond, 
evading even Marx’s attempt at materialisation (ND, p. 244). This is a mistake that reverses the true 
nature of being, that people are themselves objects: ‘It is not true that the object is a subject, as 
idealism has been drilling into us for thousands of years, but it is true that the subject is an object (ND, 
p. 179).  
                                                          
97 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 
[1966]); abbreviated to ND.  
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Thus, Negative Dialectics provides an epistemological clarification to Dialectic of Enlightenment, as 
well as an elaboration to its core propositions. ‘The suppression of nature for human ends is a mere 
natural relationship, which is why the supremacy of nature-controlling reason and its principle is a 
delusion’ (ND, p. 179). Thus, the root of enlightenment thought lies in the human cognitive 
disposition for reifying abstractions. In this way, abstraction is not only used to help identify patterns 
in the material world, but also acts as a tool in reducing the distress of confrontation with complexity, 
as mentioned above.  
By way of an example, a field study by Suzanne Simard et al. found that underground networks of 
mycorrhizal fungi could transfer carbon between trees.98 Older trees (specifically Douglas-firs) can 
transfer carbon to younger firs in order to aid their development.99 The study evinced a level of 
interconnectedness in wooded areas previously unknown to us. In the complexity of a woodland, a 
single tree therefore represents a fragmentary abstraction. Nonetheless an abstraction that allows for 
its instrumental manipulation (i.e. felling it) by endowing the concept primacy over its material 
foundation (fig. 3). 
                                                          
98 Suzanne Simard et al., ‘Net Transfer of Carbon between Ectomycorrhizal Tree Species in the Field’, Nature, 
388, 6642 (1997), p. 579. 
99 Suzanne Simard, ‘The Foundational Role of Mycorrhizal Networks in Self-Organization of Interior Douglas-
fir Forests’, Forest Ecology and Management, 258 (2009), S95-S107. 
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Figure 3: A representation of the connection between ‘hub’ trees (shaded) and neighbouring trees via 
networks of ‘colonised’ mycorrhizal fungi.100 
 
And yet it is the material investigation of the world, science, that expands and destroys these limited 
concepts—not philosophical investigation. The example of mycorrhizal fungi therefore exposes a 
conflict in Adorno’s philosophy between a distrust of abstractive thinking and a possible reliance on 
the material investigation made possible through it. 
* 
The above analysis serves as an excavation. It has attempted to show through an analysis centred on 
the Dialectic of Enlightenment that the work of Horkheimer and Adorno already contains within it an 
                                                          
100 Image retrieved from Simard, ‘Foundational Role of Mycorrhizal Networks’, p. S100. 
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ecological discourse that hinges on a concern with abstraction. In turn, their conception of reification, 
though still indebted to Lukács, is markedly different: 
Firstly, the Dialectic affirms that the foundation of a particular ‘civilising’ rationality is intrinsically 
bound to an oppressive process. The abstractive methods of an emancipatory enlightenment, such as 
the distancing (through reduction and quantification) of subject from object, are enacted for the 
destruction of animism; the mythical approach to knowing the world employed to reduce the 
intimidating complexity of the natural world. In this way reification ‘is a process that can be traced 
back to the beginnings of organized society and the use of tools’, yet reaches completion in 
industrialisation with ‘the transformation of all products of human activity into commodities’. Thus, 
reification closes the possibility of life organised around activities not productive or conducive to ‘the 
maintenance and safeguarding of the general conditions under which industry can flourish’.101 
The reductive rationality involved in demythologisation ultimately reveals itself to be an ouroboros, 
as the claims to social justice that inspired it are deemed unempirical and therefore redundant. This is 
most observable in the cultural acceptance of a ‘positivist doctrine’, a philosophical trend that, 
according to the DoE, reached its apex in the methods of investigation set out by Bacon, Comte, and 
later the Vienna Circle and early Analytic School. Positivism leaves legitimate claims to knowledge 
primarily to modern science, or at least to an idea of scientific methodology, and therefore fails to 
recognise somatic or speculative reflection as valid evidence for social change. Yet the positivist 
conception of both science and society are misleadingly short-sighted, for ‘Modern science, as 
positivists understand it, refers essentially to statements about facts, and therefore presupposes the 
reification of life in general and of perception in particular’. The task of a non-reified philosophy 
should be one that looks beyond these ‘surface phenomena that obscure rather than disclose the 
underlying reality’, and therefore avoid confounding ‘the congealed form of reality for a law of 
truth’.102 
Negative Dialectics carries forward the notions set out in the Dialect of Enlightenment, providing an 
account that attempts to articulate the deficiency inherent in abstractive thought. The domination of 
nature begins with the mistaken belief that the objects perceived are the same as the abstracted 
concepts used to define them. Forgetting the deficiency of abstraction carries the processes of 
enlightenment forward: ‘…perennial domination over nature…[is] made possible only by the process 
                                                          
101  Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 40-41. 
102 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, pp.81-82. 
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of oblivion. The loss of memory is a transcendental condition for science. All reification is a 
forgetting’ (DoE, p. 230, translation modified103). 
As seen in §1.1, the abstraction of energy constituted an amalgamation of scientific experimentalism, 
mechanic-industrial worldviews, and a cultural desire for scientific unification throughout the 
nineteenth century. It represents the acme of abstraction in nineteenth century scientific thought. Yet 
the object being pinned to the cushion, the demystification through objectification, is transformation 
itself. Therefore, Adorno’s account of reification appears very much concurrent with the reification of 
energy outlined in section 1.3, namely that the deficiency of the energy-abstraction is that it prioritises 
its consumption over the quality of its source, thereby implicitly sanctioning a complete dependence 
on fossil fuels, fracking, and other catastrophically harmful practices.  
Yet the influence of positivism is not so easily imagined. Although the way that energy is construed, it 
will be argued, can exert an influence on the way it is portrayed culturally, alongside the ways in 
which the aesthetic quality energy takes can be exploited in the ‘cleaning up’ of the oil industry.    
  
                                                          
103 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, p. 244; ‚Alle Verdinglichung ist ein Vergessen’. 
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2.2 Positivist Constructions of Energy: Mach, Planck, and BP® 
Mammon, the least erected Spirit that fell 
From heav’n, for ev’n in heav’n his looks & thoughts 
Were always downward bent, admiring more 
The riches of Heav’ns pavement, trod’n Gold, 
Then aught divine or holy else enjoy’d 
In vision beatific: by him first 
Men also, and by his suggestion taught, 
Ransack’d the Center, and with impious hands 
Rifl’d the bowels of thir mother Earth 
For Treasures better hid. Soon had his crew 
Op’nd into the Hill a spacious wound 
And dig’d out ribs of Gold104  
Although Horkheimer’s narrative around positivism extends its emergence back into pre-history, his 
aphoristic use of the word is mostly in response to the popularity of the Vienna Logical Positivists in 
the early 20th century who, though also considered anti-fascists and socialists, are nonetheless 
considered ‘as securely bound as metaphysics to the established order’ (CT, p. 140).  
The work of the Logical Positivists is vast and not easily summarised, yet perhaps quite telling is their 
shared dedication to a ‘scientific world conception’, which Neurath describes as ‘empiricist and 
positivist: there is only knowledge from experience, which rests on what is immediately given. This 
sets the limits for the content of legitimate science. Second, the scientific world-conception is marked 
by the supplication of a certain method, namely logical analysis’.105 Neurath’s concept of a scientific 
world is therefore orientated around the unification of the sciences, mirroring the goals of Comte and 
Mach, through a collapsing of the material, psychological, and historical realms.  
However, does this collapsing of realms lead to an ‘incorrect’ conception of the energy concept? Or, 
if such a statement is meaningless, does it lead to an approach to the energy concept that excuses 
ecological decimation through the erasure of variation? It seems unlikely that positivism could serve 
as Mammon, providing the conceptual foundations for an instrumental redefinition of the energy 
concept, and supplying it with those ‘impious hands’. Especially considering energy’s emergence 
                                                          
104 John Milton, Paradise Lost, (London: Penguin, 1996), pp. 26-27. 
105 Otto Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, ed. by M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973), p. 
309.  
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already thrown into the context of the ‘industrial revolution’, a by-product born of the fuel consuming 
engine. 
In fact, in many ways positivism emerges as a result of the extreme influence of physics and its 
nascent school of thermodynamics in academic practice from around 1800 onwards. Nowhere is this 
more obvious than in the work of Comte, the founder of the Positivist movement, where the 
delineation of a ‘social physics’ seeks to directly imitate physics in outlining the study of society; 
sociology.106 Ostwald too, with his social energetics, expands Rankine’s science to the study of 
society and individuals in an almost paradigmatic case of the necessary expansion of ideology 
outlined by Adorno and Horkheimer.107 
However, in order to observe whether this exploitation of scientific principles is a necessary 
consequence of positivism, it is valuable to analyse Ernst Mach’s last report on the conservation of 
energy in 1894 as a key connection between the emergence of energy in physics and the positivist 
outlook that dominated the first half of the twentieth century (Mach was seen as a precursor to, and 
key influence on, the Logical Positivist movement, although he by no means exemplifies all the 
varying positions involved108).  In this way we hope to show how the perception of abstractions 
necessarily alters the obligations they compel us to accept, and may consequently justify particular 
social practices. 
* 
Mach expresses that ‘after forty-seven years, the law of the conservation of energy, wherever 
civilisation exists, is accepted as a fully established truth and receives the widest applications in all 
domains of natural science’.109 However, rather viewing energy as marking a conceptual revolution in 
the way we conceive of the world, one occurring in the process of mass industrialisation, instead 
‘people are led to see that the new view was long prepared for and ready for enunciation, only a few 
favoured minds had perceived it much earlier than the rest, and in this way the opposition of the 
majority is overcome’ (Mach, p. 138).  
                                                          
106 August Comte, Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings, ed. by G. Lenzer (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1975). 
107 See, Stewart, ‘Sociology, Culture and Energy’. 
108 Paul Feyerabend ‘Mach's Theory of Research and its Relation to Einstein’, Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science, 15, 1 (1984), 1-22. 
109 Ernst Mach, Popular Scientific Lectures, trans. by T. J. McCormack (Chicago: Open Court, 1898), p. 137-38, 
emphasis in original.  
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The discussion of the conservation of energy locates its conceptual antecedent in the impossibility of 
perpetual motion, as investigated by Simon Stevin and Galileo; before continuing onto the work in 
thermodynamics (inspired ‘by the invention of the steam-engine, and by its great technical 
importance’; Mach, p. 160) that led more directly to the energy principle.  
In the final section of the paper, Mach briefly discusses the energy principle through the lens of his 
positivist epistemology: ‘All knowledge of nature is derived in the last instance from experience. In 
this sense they are right who look upon the principle of energy as a result of experience’ (Mach, p. 
179). The interdependency of sense-elements is evidenced by their simultaneity of occurrence, which 
leads to the observation of their connection without relying on contestable claims to cause and effect. 
The helpful analogy of a triangle is given, of which each angle will change with one another in 
preserving a total 180º without needing to know which angle is the one being manipulated. This 
complete primacy of experience ultimately leads to only one possible conclusion: ‘In experience, 
therefore, is buried the ultimate well-spring of all knowledge of nature, and consequently, in this 
sense, also the ultimate source of the principle of energy’ (Mach, p. 181).   
The emphasis on the impossibility of perpetual motion that takes up the majority of Mach’s account is 
required to establish the notion that energy is a perceivable entity in everyday life. This brings energy 
into the fringes of our entire perceptual experience. We can directly feel, whenever we move through 
and work in the world, the limits of our abilities—fatigue. The yearning for freedom from fatigue 
creates a fascination with perpetual motion, yet its perceived possibility is only a consequence of a 
confusion over more basic mechanical laws (fig.4), or intentional trickery.110 The conservation of 
energy is the generalised idea that work or force cannot come from nowhere, it is therefore 
fundamentally bound to limitations.  
                                                          
110 For example, Charles Redheffer presented his perpetual motion machine in both Philadelphia and New York 
City from around 1813 to 1820. It was exposed as a hoax, being controlled by a wire connected to a hand turned 
crank being turned by an old man in the room above.  
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Figure 4: ‘The Epitaph of Stevin’. The higher number of balls on the left side of the triangle creates 
the impression that the chain should continuously spin. However, Stevin, in rejecting the absurdity of 
perceptual motion, illustrates the ways in which the direction of force from the weight of the balls 
interacts with one another and the triangle. It has been suggested that Stevin’s occupation and 
innovations as a bookkeeper formed a pre-held conception of the impossibility of perpetual motion 
and equilibrium.111  
                                                          
111 Mirowski, p. 121; Michael Chatfield, A History of Accounting Thought, rev. ed. (Huntington: R. E. Krieger 
Pub. Co, 1977). Image retrieved from Simon Stevin, The Principal Works of Simon Stevin, Vol. I; General 
Introduction Mechanics, ed. by E. J. Dijksterhuis (Amsterdam: C. V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1955), p. 47. 
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For Mach, therefore, the received wisdom that nothing comes for nothing may take many historical 
forms, but ultimately all act as less accurate prefaces to modern physics and the energy concept. His 
history of science situates energy as the most recent explanation in an ongoing investigation into the 
observed impossibility of perpetual motion, thereby giving no real significance to the historical 
context of European industrialisation. The explication given, therefore, despite its historical quality, is 
strictly depoliticised. This impression conflicts with even the brief historical account given in §1.1, 
and demonstrates a concrete example of the failings of positivism in analysing the progression of 
science. However, although I argue this is a mistake, the question remains as to whether it can be 
considered a reification. 
Certainly, the positivist conception in Mach disguises the presence of transference and translatability 
fundamental to energy. The transfer in fuel use that occurred in the nineteenth century from a society 
primarily dependent on biomass to one reliant on the burning of hydrocarbons, coal in particular, is 
one that is paved with the labour and extortion of a working class population. At the peak of 
employment, British coal extraction in the 1920s required 1.2 million workers (7% of the total labour 
force); the sheer size of this industry was made possible through exploitative processes such as the use 
of child labour in the early eighteenth century and excessive deforestation.112 The intense use of 
labour in establishing the coal industry represents:  
…an impressive example of how every transition to a new form of energy supply has 
to be powered by the intensive deployment of existing energies and prime movers: 
the transition from wood to coal had to be energized by human muscles, coal 
combustion powered the development of oil, and…today’s solar photovoltaic cells 
and wind turbines are embodiments of fossil energies required to smelt the requisite 
metals, synthesize the needed plastics, and process other materials requiring high 
energy inputs.113 
The emergence of the conservation of energy in the midst of this transition to coal signifies the period 
of ‘power from any source’, which the concept of energy accommodates for with its unifying 
influence. Labour and machine, coal and wood are made equivalent through the energy abstraction. It 
is not until confronted with the problem of global warming that energy fully reveals its frightening 
nonidentity. The transition to greener sources of energy indicates the termination of the period of 
power from any source, and thereby necessitates a re-conception of the energy abstraction.  
                                                          
112 Smil, Energy and Civilisation, ch.5.  
113 Smil, p.230.  
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The positivist conception cannot account for the transformative effect energy ultimately pertains to, as 
an analytic tool as well as a set of socially organised practices. In this way, Mach’s account 
effectively brackets the interaction between subjective experience and conceptual abstraction: To 
Mach scientific abstractions such as the energy concept are ever-more accurate ways of differentiating 
what we already perceive, and therefore ignores how they may be hugely influential on the way we 
see the world and how we organise society.114 
However, Mach’s approach does not result in the reification of energy as the creation of energy as 
energy. The somatic-perceptual basis of scientific abstractions and concepts in Mach’s philosophy 
fetters the energy concept to limitation rather than transformation, to fatigue rather than productivity. 
Thus conceived, unlike Marx’s commodity, energy acquires little credence in its formation and, 
instead retaining the mark of its social dimension. That is, it does not appear so objective, and 
therefore cannot be used to justify socio-political regimes.  
Therefore, in some ways the positivism of Mach in fact appears as force against the dangers of 
reifying energy—of treating energy as an object unto itself—even if it results in other unacceptable 
consequences. This becomes clear when examining the different ways in which Mach and Max 
Planck advanced the ‘de-anthropomorphisation’ of energy and energy conservation.115  
Planck, insisted on the existence of physical concepts independently to human observation or 
theorisation, heavily criticising Mach in a series of attacking essays.116 To Planck energy was the key 
to distinguishing physics from other disciplines, and therefore had to be proven to exist without 
philosophical scaffolding; ‘thus, I could simply leave out everything which transgresses the strictly 
physical domain, especially the philosophical speculations, which have all too often been connected to 
the concept of energy’.117 Also to the flames went all notion of any historical context of its inception. 
Rather, the principle of energy conservation is considered to be a real entity devoid of any human 
influence, and although Planck would not wish to endorse energy as a substance, in energy’s complete 
de-anthropomorphisation it gains the quality of standing on its own feet, establishing physics at the 
summit of a unified scientific outlook. 
                                                          
114 See Rabinbach, The Human Motor, for the influence of the energy concept on a ‘productivist’ approach to 
economy and our own bodies.  
115 Daan Wegener, ‘De-Anthropomorphizing Energy and Energy Conservation: The case of Max Planck and 
Ernst Mach’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41, 2 (2010), 146-59. 
116 See essays collated in Stephen Toulmin, ed., Physical Reality: Philosophical Essays on 20th Century Physics 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1970). 
117 Quoted in Wegener, p. 148. 
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Planck’s naïve realist view of energy is one of many ways in which energy can be instrumentalised in 
cleaning up fuel by removing it from its mode of production. This is well demonstrated by the 2001 
rebranding of BP (fig. 5).  
 
Figure 5: Spectres of Urizen? Top, the BP shield logo designed in 1920 by AR Sanders and used from 
1989 to 2000. Bottom, the logo adopted from 2001 onwards. 
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The 2001 BP rebranding included its second name change from British Petroleum to Beyond 
Petroleum, with an accompanying aesthetic transformation of the company logo.118 (Despite this 
suggestive change in name, it is worth noting BP continue to produce an equivalent of 3.7 million 
barrels of oil a day according to their website119). The older shield-shaped design is reminiscent of a 
purposeful industry; mechanical and engineering. Conversely, in the later logo, the green and yellow 
colour scheme is utilised in displaying a sunburst. Human artifice is removed to display the process of 
photosynthesis, the transition of energy from the sun to biomass. Consequently, the new logo 
intimates towards energy as energy. That is, any sense of an inherently industrial connection with the 
company is severed via relying on a (fictionalised) pure form of the energy concept.  
BP continues to rebrand itself in ways that mask the process of its production, including the 
appropriation of community and diversity projects.120 In this way, oil companies become ethically 
inclined ‘energy companies’, delivering a clean product to households and businesses—the relation 
between the burning of fossil fuels and the use of commercial energy is successfully masked by the 
reification of energy, enabled by a lasting ‘realist’ approach to its scientific history. After all, ‘these 
companies have every reason to blur distinctions between fuels and energy. The more mystification 
the better’.121 
An ecocritical theory of abstractions, therefore, must account for the obligations of how an abstraction 
is construed in scientific and visual culture. Yet the equating of positivism with reification in the work 
of Horkheimer and Adorno ultimately fails to account for all the ways that a scientific theory may 
become reified, as demonstrated by observing Planck’s anti-positivism. It is not in our current interest 
to defend a particular outlook on scientific theory (realist, constructivist, positivist, etc.) instead it is 
emphasised that particular abstractions may be forwarded with differing ontological status depending 
on different intentions (e.g. unity vs priority in the case of Mach vs Planck respectively), and that 
these different statuses may oblige us in different ways.  
  
                                                          
118 The corporation had changed name from Anglo-Persian Oil—a reflection of BPs original role extracting oil 
from a large oil field discovered in Masjed Soleyman, Iran—to British Petroleum in 1954. 
119 <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/what-we-do/bp-at-a-glance.html> [accessed 25 September 2019]. 
120 Although, ‘We want to build teams that reflect the communities we serve’ is admittedly a more realistic 
promise than reflecting the communities they exploit: <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-
sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/sustainability/group-reports/bp-sustainability-report-2018.pdf> [accessed 25 
September 2019]. 
121 Karen Pinkus, Fuel: A Speculative Dictionary (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), p.3. 
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Section 3: Economic Orthodoxy and the Laws of Thermodynamics 
An investigation into reification would in many ways remain incomplete absenting the transformation 
it undergoes in Habermasian theory. Hitherto, the reification critiques outlined have taken the form of 
two out of the three typical critiques of capitalism pointed out by Jaeggi: 122 A moral critique asserting 
that reification emerges out of the exploitative functions of capitalism and an ethical critique that 
situates reification as part of the general degradation of life and free thought. The mapping of these 
critiques with the energy abstraction draws out the way that the concept of energy may play a role in 
masking exploitation, or collapses theoretical alternatives to the capitalist crisis. This third section 
intends to situate reification and the energy abstraction within a functional critique—one that views 
capitalist organisation as systematically dysfunctional or corruptive.  
As I hope to have shown in section 2, the theory of Adorno and Horkheimer fits quite naturally into 
an ecocritical theory of abstractions. In the most part this is due to the pre-existing ‘environmental’ 
argument that weaves through the Dialectic of Enlightenment, as well as Adorno’s conception of 
nonidentity forming an alternative expression around the innate ‘incompleteness’ and fluidity of 
abstractive thought. The difficulty to overcome in their work, however, is the tendency to apply to a 
holistic argument. That is, deriving an ethical standard towards Nature and each other from a ‘more 
complete’ image of the entire causal nexus of our environment. This is an argument we have 
attempted to avoid throughout, for both its inherent impossibility and its potential for degeneracy.  
The relevance of Habermas to our current project does not appear quite so intuitive. Firstly, because 
of a change of focus from epistemology to sociology in his work, where direct allusions to science 
and the prioritisation of certain knowledge forms give way for a more systematic theory of society and 
its failings. Secondly because nature, or some notion of it, no longer plays an active part in the 
analysis of society. Which, as we shall see, has created controversy over the ecological efficacy of 
Habermas’s theory. 
However, the Habermasian approach benefits greatly from its aversion of the holistic argument, as 
made explicitly in the delineation of a ‘postmetaphysical thinking’. 123 Briefly, a postmetaphysical 
philosophy attempts an alternative to the totalising systems of knowledge offered by previous 
systematic philosophies (which Habermas also characterises as identity thinking), as well as rejecting 
                                                          
122 Rahel Jaeggi, ‘What (if anything) is Wrong with Capitalism? Dysfunctionality, exploitation and alienation: 
three approaches to the critique of capitalism’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 54 (2016), 44-65. 
123 Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. by W. M. Hohengarten 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 28-53. 
58 
 
the total deconstruction and repudiation of rationality as commonly ascribed to the postmodern 
philosophies. Rather, philosophy must also situate itself in a socio-historical context and deny 
universality. I interpret this rejection of the ‘metaphysical’ philosophy—derived from the ‘Ancient 
philosophy that inherits from myth its view of the whole’—as an outright rejection of escaping the use 
of abstractions by applying to a constructed ‘bigger picture’, despite the necessity to constantly 
transform abstractions. 124  
Section 3 starts with a detailed outline of reification outlined in Habermas’s major work, The Theory 
of Communicative Action. I argue that the depiction of reification forwarded here can be read as 
attempting to delineate the appropriate abstractions for organising society and ethical life, which he 
takes to be a form of ideal communication. A new concern therefore arises as to whether the scientific 
abstractions that inform our understanding of global warming can be successively included in the 
process of social organisation. Therefore, this segment can be seen as an attempt to map an ecology of 
abstractions (or practices) and their obligations, as called for in preceding sections. 
Next, we will look into the reception of Habermasian theory in an ecological or green context. This 
will situate our analysis in the context of a broader debate around communicative ethics and the crisis 
of global warming.  
As we will see, the reification critique outlined in Habermas is one concerned with the over-extension 
of legal, bureaucratic, or market systems into the realms of life that frame communicative structures—
what Habermas terms ‘the colonisation of the lifeworld by system’. In the final chapter, this critique 
will be carried forward to analyse the influence of energy and thermodynamics on economics, and the 
colonisation of energy by the rationality of marketisation as constituting two possible forms of 
reification of the energy abstraction.  
  
                                                          
124 Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 29. 
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3.1 Reification in The Theory of Communicative Action: Colonisation of the 
Lifeworld 
The Theory of Communicative Action, split over two volumes, returns to the role of rationality in 
social organisation. 125 Here, however, in the effort to provide a secure perspective for social critique, 
Critical Theory is absorbed into the linguistic turn:126 
We would not be able to ascertain the rational internal structure of action oriented to 
reaching understanding if we did not already have before us—in fragmentary and 
distorted form, to be sure—the existing forms of a reason that has to rely on being 
symbolically embodied and historically situated (TCA I, p. xli). 
This ‘rational internal structure of action’ is to be located within language and discourse since, 
according to Habermas’s concept of Universal Pragmatics, ‘Institutionally unbound speech acts owe 
their illocutionary force’—the intention of the speaker behind a given utterance—‘to a cluster of 
validity claims that must be raised reciprocally by a speaker and hearer, and recognised by them as 
justified, if grammatical (that is comprehensible) sentences are to…result in successful 
communication’.127 These intrinsic validity claims in language represent the ‘existing forms of reason’ 
that have been responsible for, yet heavily distorted in, the transition into modernity. The massive 
onus on discourse becomes apparent when Habermas states that language ‘remains in a peculiar half-
transcendence in the performance of our communicative actions and expressions, it presents itself to 
the speaker and actor (preconsciously) as a segment of reality sui generis’.128 
Evidently, in drawing out the implicit structures of linguistic understanding, Habermas attempts to 
delineate an abstraction capable of informing societal organisation. Reification, therefore, takes on 
the form of a corruption or obfuscation of this abstraction. 
                                                          
125 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 
trans. by T. McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1984); The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol.2: Lifeworld and 
System, trans. T. McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1987); abbreviated to TCA I & II. 
126 The linguistic turn commonly refers to an approach that investigated the relationship between language and 
reality, occurring primarily in the 20th century, and is characterised by ‘the view that philosophical problems are 
problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the 
language we presently use’; Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967), p. 3. 
127 Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. by M. Cooke (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 88. 
128 Habermas, Pragmatics of Communication, p. 88. 
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* 
At the end of TCA I, Habermas states that Western Marxism has been mistaken in its prior conception 
of reification: 
The reception of Weber’s theory of rationalization from Lukacs to Adorno makes it 
clear that the rationalisation of society has constantly been thought of as a reification 
of consciousness. The paradoxes to which this leads show, however, that this theme 
cannot be treated with the conceptual means of the philosophy of consciousness. 
(TCA I, p. 399) 
Therefore, the concept of reification must be reformulated within the framework of communicative 
action and ‘the formations of subsystems of steering media’ (TCA I, p. 399). However, the description 
of reification given in TCA I implicitly suggests that the communicative approach and the 
reformulation of subsystems will attempt to synthesise (by way of providing a functionalist solution) 
Lukácsian reification with the more generalised reification put forward by Horkheimer and Adorno. 
The critique of instrumental reason as merely the extension of reification will be abandoned, instead 
the destructive instrumental reason explicated so magisterially by Horkheimer and Adorno becomes a 
consequence of reified subsystems. This allows the concept of reification to become, once again, a 
historically bound concept: 
Lukacs used the concept of reification to describe that peculiar compulsion to 
assimilate the interhuman relations (and subjectivity) to the world of things, which 
comes about when social actions are no longer coordinated through values, norms, 
or linguistic understanding, but through the medium of exchange value. Horkheimer 
and Adorno detach the concept not only from the special historical context of the rise 
of the capitalist economic system but from the dimension of interhuman relations 
altogether; and they generalize it temporally (over the entire history of the species) 
and substantively (the same logic of domination is imputed to both cognition in the 
service of self-preservation and the repression of instinctual nature). (TCA I, p. 379, 
my emphasis) 
Here we can detect a somewhat generous reinterpretation of Lukács which aligns his position with the 
one to be explicated in TCA II. Again, a postmetaphysical thinking rejects the totalising component of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s position. A position which ultimately led, in Habermas’ view, to the 
prompt abandonment of the programme of Critical Theory by Horkheimer, qua an ‘interdisciplinary 
materialism’ utilizing empirical sociology and epistemology (TCA I, pp. 385-386). This ‘interruption’ 
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in the task of Critical Theory, however, is to be resolved in TCA II through the systematic 
reintroduction of a communicatively bound rationality mediated through the ‘system-lifeworld 
dichotomy’.  
The lifeworld, a concept taken from the phenomenology of Husserl, is the symbolic sandpit that 
allows communication to take place. It ensures that in routine communication any new 
communicative situation can occur within a ‘stock of knowledge that is “always already” familiar’ 
(TCA II, p. 125). That is, the lifeworld includes any implicit (and explicit) knowledge necessary for 
communication or understanding to be reached from, e.g., from the specific geographical 
surroundings of the interlocutors attempting understanding to the linguistic and general cultural 
practices at large. The lifeworld therefore acts as the intermediary tools of communication between 
social-actors by allowing their corresponding subjective, social, and objective worlds to be discussed 
and disputed. It gives cultural and situational factors substance by making them functional, and by 
employing these factors in communication they are symbolically reproduced and thereby sustained.  
Rationalisation of the lifeworld is considered a necessary product of modernity and is not lamented. In 
culture, rationalisation results in defiance to power-homogeneity in both aesthetic and moral realms, 
such as that enforced by the Christian-monarch-orthodoxy. In a given society, rationalisation may lead 
to the emergence of the legally-represented individual, that is, the notion of civil rights and justice.129 
In general, the rationalisation of the lifeworld shifts its shared concepts away from a justification in 
tradition towards justification from the demos; from the democratic process of discussion, 
deliberation, and understanding.  
The question remains, however, whether a scientific quantification and explication of the mechanical 
processes in the world, as exemplified by the energy concept in physics, acts as a rationalisation of the 
lifeworld in any meaningful democratic sense. It certainly allows for democratic discussions around 
energy uses, production, and efficiency in deciding political structuring and re-structuring. However, 
in turn this demands a commitment to a particular worldview, with a similarly unnerving sentiment 
towards unification we saw expressed by the Victorian energy-pioneers. Which raises the question: 
                                                          
129 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere [1962] is a historical, sociological tracing of this process; 
specifically, the development of the public sphere in European bourgeois society that allowed for open 
discussion of law and governance reliant on rational argument rather than power relations alone; Jürgen 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, trans. by T. Burger and F. Lawrence (Oxford: Polity, 1989). 
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Does a democratically organised conservationist approach to fuel and biodiversity covertly require a 
monoculture in worldview?130 
Habermas’s answer may be only insofar as it replaces traditional power structures, as this 
democratisation of the lifeworld becomes possible precisely because rationalisation extends the ‘scope 
of contingency for establishing interpersonal relationships’ (TCA II, p. 146)—that is, by challenging 
traditional worldviews it opens up new space for action orientated by understanding. However, the 
space opened up in the disruption of tradition by rationalisation is competed for by the steering media 
of institutional-power and money.  
As mentioned above, societies are conceived of as a concurrent system and lifeworld. System can be 
viewed as the culmination of existing societal organisations and institutions that substitute 
communicative action by guiding behaviour non-linguistically through utilising steering media. 
Features of system include law, bureaucracy, and markets. Pre-modernity, system and lifeworld are 
tightly interwoven structures that inform one another in the respective segmental differentiation 
involved in the division of labour. However, as the pressure placed on everyday language intensifies 
from the increased complexity and rationalisation of society in modernity, the system and lifeworld 
uncouple. This subsequently leads to system—and the instrumental steering media of money and 
institutional power it utilises to guide action—to excessively inform the lifeworld. This process, the 
colonisation of the lifeworld, is understood to be the causal factor ‘behind the reification phenomena 
in advanced capitalist societies’ (TCA II, p. 322). 
The system and lifeworld dichotomy, however, is often harshly criticised, notably by Nancy Fraser. 131 
Fraser incisively evaluates the distinction of system and lifeworld in reference to its ability to account 
for, and deal with, real social issues—namely a feminist critique—by showing that the system-
lifeworld dichotomy, when delineated along occupational lines, necessarily excludes childrearing 
from the paid economy. However, I argue that it is only when drawing the system and lifeworld 
abstractions along either occupational boundaries or between realms of material (system) and 
symbolic (lifeworld) production that such pernicious obligations become relevant. 
Habermas’s use of builders as an example in elucidating the function of the lifeworld is very telling in 
this regard (TCA II, 121-123), as the influence of the lifeworld makes itself apparent in the labour of 
                                                          
130 Postmetaphysical II largely centres around the notions of secularity and democracy, future research could 
look to elucidate this problem within Habermas’s recent work in the philosophy of religion; Jürgen Habermas, 
Postmetaphysical Thinking II: Essays and Replies, trans. by C. Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017). 
131 Nancy Fraser, ‘What's Critical about Critical Theory? The case of Habermas and gender’, New German 
Critique, 35 (1985), 97-131.  
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those more closely aligned with material reproduction; in the process of material reproduction 
motivated through systems steering media, the builders nonetheless communicate through the method 
in which, ‘By drawing upon a cultural tradition, they also continue it’ (TCA II, 125). This inherently 
suggests that it is not in the distinction between occupations of material reproduction (such as 
builders) versus occupations of symbolic reproduction (such as childrearing) that the system-lifeworld 
dichotomy operates. 
Another critique Fraser puts forward is that Habermas neglects the patriarchal dominance that occurs 
in both system and lifeworld facets of society. This disrupts a notion of a ‘pure’ lifeworld corrupted 
by a malicious system, and remains a valid critique of Habermas’ work, as he does very little to 
acknowledge feminist social issues in his delineation of society and the transition to modernity. It 
appears problematic for Habermas to write so extensively on modernisation while giving almost all 
volition to a dialectic between linguistic organisation and its corruption, yet very little to the 
subjugation and exploitation of minority social groups.  
However, this does not mean the analysis of modernity Habermas provides is impractical in the 
service of social equality. Fraser herself draws on other aspects of TCA without alteration.132 
However, I believe she is mistaken in excluding the separation of system and lifeworld as potentially 
liberating abstractions, at least under the interpretation given above. For the co-existing patriarchy in 
system and lifeworld reinforces the view that feminist analysis ought not merely be orientated towards 
economic factors alone, such as equal pay and getting women into the workplace etc., but also 
towards uncovering how patriarchy is transmitted in the cultural and symbolic facets of the lifeworld 
in a way that subtly maintains male-dominance.133 
* 
If, as our analysis of Fraser has shown, system and lifeworld cannot be divided occupationally, our 
concern is whether they can be divided between concepts derived and accepted from scientific culture. 
That is, can a concept like energy be deemed only relevant for the lifeworld or system? And if so, is 
the reification of energy simply its misapplication in informing the lifeworld or system?  
                                                          
132 Nancy Fraser, ‘Toward a Discourse of Ethic Theory’, Praxis International, 5, 4 (1985b), 425-29; ‘Women, 
Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation’, Thesis Eleven, 17, 1 (1987), 88-106. 
133 The importance of material redistribution compared to that of ‘recognition’ is defended by Fraser in Nancy 
Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political Philosophical Exchange, trans. by J. 
Golb, J. Ingram, and C. Wilke (London: Verso, 2003).   
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The answer, plainly, is that it is not—as the inclusion of scientific abstractions must ultimately 
influence both system and lifeworld simultaneously. The concept of energy from thermodynamics is 
influential in our shared lifeworld, it helps to reach understanding and organise practices. For example 
the expression ‘Turn off the light, it wastes energy!’ relies on at least a minimally technical notion of 
energy to make sense. Yet the energy concept also clearly informs the implementation and efficiency 
of systematic institutions, which in large part rely on the technical control of the applied sciences (and 
their implicit logic of productivity). 
Herein lies the potential role of an ecocritical theory of abstractions, as although scientific theory cuts 
through the distinction of system and lifeworld, the concealed obligations in particular abstractions 
may facilitate the colonisation of lifeworld by system. Reification here may therefore provide a 
helpful framework from which to analyse scientific abstractions and the ways in which they exceed 
the boundaries of their applicability, or subsume other abstractions into them rather than mapping 
connections. A paradigmatic case of this, it will be argued in §3.3, has occurred with between 
thermodynamics and economics.   
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3.2 Nature as communicator; Habermasian Ecology  
Before we apply the formulation of reification as the colonisation of the lifeworld to our concern with 
the energy concept, it is beneficial to outline the pre-existing work that applies and develops theories 
of communicative action in environmental politics. This will help locate our approach in distinction to 
others, and to contend an inherent ecological facet of the lifeworld.  
Gunderson provides an overview of the debate surrounding the inclusion of Habermasian discourse 
ethics in an ecological philosophy/sociology, and suggests the break with Adorno and Horkheimer 
negatively impacted the acceptance of discourse ethics and communicative action in eco-theory.134 To 
many theorists, Habermas’ perceived neo-Kantianism falls into the same anthropocentric trap of the 
Enlightenment philosophy it attempts to reconstitute, as once again all volition is stripped from 
material nature and bestowed exclusively on humanity.135   
Alternatively, Vogel suggests that the focus on communication allows for the full designation of 
nature to the social realm, which they diagnose as the core problem extending throughout Critical 
Theory since Lukács. That is, Critical Theory ultimately failed at attempting to derive ethical 
practices from nature whilst simultaneously maintaining the counter-notion that to do so was an 
impossibility and had resulted in the violent assuredness of fascism as well as the icy calculation and 
exploitation of industrial capitalism, much as our own arguments against holism have asserted. Vogel 
concludes that only humans can ascribe ethical judgments to nature, and therefore our interaction with 
the biophysical world must ultimately be determined through communication. 136 The problem with 
this view, however, is that it can never give a strong account to the environment.  
Therefore, there are those who revise Habermas’s original formulation of communicative action such 
as Dryzek and Eckersley.137 Broadly, these theorists attempt to reformulate discourse ethics so that 
nature itself can play a role as a communicative interlocutor. Dryzek introduces the concept of 
ecological rationality, reached through the systematic reorganisation of society with an orientation 
towards ideal-speech situations. Although revising certain concepts is necessary to achieve this, 
                                                          
134 Gunderson, ‘Habermas in Environmental Thought’. 
135 Joel Whitebook, ‘The Problem of Nature in Habermas’, Telos, 40 (1979), 41-69; and Robyn Eckersley, 
‘Habermas and Green Political Thought’, Theory and Society, 19, 6 (1990), 739-776; ‘Liberal Democracy and 
the Rights of nNature: The struggle for inclusion’, Environmental Politics, 4, 4 (1995), 169-198.   
136 Vogel, Against Nature.  
137 John Dryzek, Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); 
Robyn Eckersley, ‘The Discourse Ethic and the Problem of Representing Nature’, Environmental Politics, 8, 2 
(1999), 24-49. 
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Dryzek argues that as communicative action is normatively disposed to generalised political interests 
rather than particulars (i.e. long-term goals rather than short-term politics), an ecological rationality 
focused on sustainability will necessarily emerge as the most general form of political interest.  
Eckersley, on the other hand, wishes to change from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric ethical 
model, yet one still grounded in discourse ethics. This is achieved by taking the autopoiesis (the self-
regulation of a balanced system) of an ecological system as representative of its intrinsic value and 
allowing that value-interest to be represented in a deliberative democracy. In other words, the 
intentions of an ecosystem are derived from what sustains its regeneration, and these intentions should 
be represented in the democratic process.  
Brulle argues against Eckersley’s amendments on both theoretical and political grounds to give the 
most ardent account of a non-revisionist Habermasian eco-theory.138 According to Brulle, theoretical 
problems arise from the basic assumptions of autopoiesis (or systems) ecology: Firstly, systems 
ecology is presented as an outdated concept by ecologists, who reject this notion of a self-regulating 
model of nature in favour of an evolutionary model that presents nature in constant procedural 
adaptation. Deriving an ethical system from a self-regulatory nature, Brulle argues, advances a 
misleading certainty in establishing a telos, something at odds with contemporary ecological practice, 
or at least reliant on vague notions of stability and stasis. 139  
Perhaps more importantly, ethical systems based on systems ecology inherently endorses the nature-
society divide, fixed natural concepts, and a static notion of human nature; the natural self-regulation 
is perceived as corrupted by the artifice of human behaviour. Furthermore, autopoiesis as an ethical 
system commits the is-ought fallacy, the deriving of normative sentiments from what there is (perhaps 
more accurately it asserts an appeal to nature, the problematic consequences of which punctuate the 
pages of Dialectic of Enlightenment).  
Brulle’s defence of Habermasian Critical Theory is in fact grounded in its inability, or unwillingness, 
to give a theory of value to nature. Ethical questions, such as ‘what should we do?’, are separated 
from moral concerns of who should be included in making ethical decisions and how this process 
                                                          
138 Robert Brulle, ‘Habermas and Green Political Thought: Two roads converging’, Environmental Politics, 11, 
4 (2002), 1-20. 
139 Kristen Shrader-Frechette and Earl D. McCoy, ‘How the Tail Wags the Dog: How value judgments 
determine ecological science’, Environmental Values, 3, 2 (1994), 107-20. Brulle’s representation of 
autopoiesis, however, is a crude one. It also ignores the possible influence of the concept on systems theory 
sociology and Habermas, directly or indirectly. For a short introduction to autopoiesis see Jakob Arnoldi, 
‘Autopoiesis’, Theory, Culture & Society, 23, 2-3 (2006), 116. 
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should be realised. Consequently, Critical Theory can no longer provide an ethical account of how we 
should treat nature, but it does not block any theories of value that may emerge from political, 
cultural, religious or philosophical spheres. Ultimately, it aims at political action preventing 
ecological damage while avoiding any claim to privileged access about the world or nature—a 
conception very much in line with Habermas’s project of postmetaphysical thinking, and our own.  
We can see that generally the debates that surround Habermas and ecology seem to revolve around 
the ability to predict the intentions of nature, whether nature can be represented by looking at its 
fundamental qualities or aspects, and if not whether communication alone could account for the 
necessary restructuring of practices in diverting ecological destruction.  
Yet communication, in Habermas’ system or otherwise, does not occur in a rational vacuum, but 
rather appears as a consequence of branching physical systems from larynxes to landscapes. 
Therefore, as Dryzek suggests, free communication should intrinsically possess an orientation of 
preservation towards the physical systems it relies upon.  The disruption of this orientation, however, 
is caused by Habermas’s reformulation of reification—the colonisation of the lifeworld; therefore 
comprising the suppression of the inherently ecological facet of the lifeworld to the instrumental logic 
of system.  
The lifeworld can become colonised by the logic inherent in fuel consumption. As Buell argues, 
inherent in the materiality of oil, its explosive extraction and obscene power capacity, comes the 
potential to over-rule the processes of reaching understanding with one another in subtle ways:  ‘Oil, 
once systematized, began transforming social life – sending out tentacles into people’s private 
lifeworlds to change them in what seemed, to many (but not all), exuberantly positive ways’.140 
However, can the concept of energy itself and its obligations outlined in section 1 be exposed in a 
similar fashion? 
 
  
                                                          
140 Buell, p. 283.  
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3.3 Energy as coloniser, energy colonised: Economics and Marketisation 
In this final segment we will return once more to the reification of energy, with reification in its 
revised formulation as the colonisation of the lifeworld. I argue that the appropriation of the energy 
abstraction has been utilised in the colonisation of lifeworld, which in turn reinforces growth-
orientated economic orthodoxy that prevents the necessary changes in the face of ecological collapse.  
Firstly, the role of energy as a coloniser of the lifeworld will be investigated through the appropriation 
of thermodynamics by neoclassical economists. Then we will outline how energy has been colonised 
by it being constructed as an unproblematic commodity.  
* 
In 2018 Nordhaus William won the ‘Nobel Prize’ for integrating climate change into long-run 
macroeconomic analysis. 141 Yet one may refer to the following extract to get a sense of the economic 
orthodoxy that prevails throughout his work: 
The likelihood that people will be richer in the future is no excuse for ignoring 
climate change today. But it is also a reminder that we will leave our grandchildren a 
more productive economy alongside a degraded climate. If you compare the 
projected living standards in 2100 or 2200 …, you can see that it would take an 
enormous amount of climate damage to offset the fruits of future productivity growth 
on our living standards.  
Should we conclude from this example that our problem is too much economic 
growth? That we should aim for zero economic growth? Few people today draw this 
conclusion. It would be like throwing out all the groceries because the milk is sour. 
The appropriate response is to fix the market failure by repairing the flawed 
economic externality involved in climate change.142 
                                                          
141 Officially the ‘The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel’, as Nobel did 
not actually set up an economics prize. It has been suggested by Mirowski that the Sveriges bank award has 
facilitated the rise of neoclassical economics; see the following interview, 
<https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2290-what-is-a-nobel-prize-winning-economist-philip-mirowski-
investigates> [accessed 25 September 2019]. 
142 William Nordhaus, The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 82. 
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What is alarming about the above analysis is that it views global warming merely as an incidental 
economic (negative) externality—a cost which is not accounted for in the immediate price system or 
unintentionally incurred by a third party. Economic organisation and the uninhibited search for 
growth is absolved of responsibility, and the historical antecedents that entangle the producers of 
these externalities with the current theories of economics are buried under a series of mathematical 
projections.  
The reception Nordhaus’s account of global warming epitomises the influence of neoclassical 
economics in the field, an approach that, I argue, stands at odds with Habermas’s social theory and 
even constitutes a case of reification by his account.  
The functionalist-reification outlined in Habermas, when applied to the energy concept, unearths its 
role in the construction of a political process and outlook frequently referred to as ‘neoliberalism’. As 
a popular phrase, neoliberalism has taken on a somewhat uncomfortably vague and polemical guise. 
In its general use, however, the term incites an overarching confidence in neoclassical economics and 
the expansion of individual rights within a liberal political system. Habermas eschews using the 
phrase neoliberalism in his diagnosis of society to give priority to a systematic outline of capitalist 
organisation, one that refuses to assume neoliberalism as a doctrine held by powerful individuals or a 
sheepishly misled public.143 Instead, TCA emphasises interactions between societal institutions that 
form around an unrecognised system-lifeworld division, where institutions may consequently align in 
the subjugation of democratic processes. Therefore, in many ways reification is neoliberalism to 
Habermas; as the extension of the market-system into the realms of social organisation.  
Mirowski outlines the historical reliance on conservation principles and substance theories in 
economics that were largely justified through their similarity to natural philosophy, later science, and 
physics in particular: 
…the most basic practice of reification in classical political economy was the 
postulation of a metaphor of value as a discrete substance in motion, created in 
production, conserved in the exchange of equivalents …, and destroyed in 
unproductive consumption.144  
                                                          
143 Habermas points towards this in Between Facts and Norms: ‘Money and administrative power are systemic 
mechanisms of societal integration that do not necessarily coordinate actions via the intentions of participants, 
but objectively, "behind the backs" of participants’; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contribution 
to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. by W. Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 39. 
144 Mirowski, More Heat than Light, p. 176. 
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Yet the employment of value and physical motion as metaphors was bidirectional during classical 
political economy—as the notion of value played a direct role in uncovering and supporting positions 
in natural philosophy.  
Neoclassical economics, however, rose to prominence during a period where physics was at a peak in 
influence, when the unifying implications of thermodynamics suggested a pathway for all disciplines 
to bask in its reflection. Whereas the cross-use of disciplinary paradigms can be indispensable in new 
formulations, the incorporation of thermodynamic formulas from physics into economics justified 
neoclassical formulations through association rather than any necessary comparison or even useful 
analogy. In short, neoclassical schools dispatched their competitors through a superficial application 
to the authority of physics and the energy-concept (Mirowski, p. 398).  
Specifically, the so-called ‘Marginal Revolution’ of the 1870s approached the problem of 
commensurability of commodities by displacing the emphasis ‘from external substances to the mind, 
[with] the mind portrayed as a field of force in an independently constituted commodity space’ 
(Mirowski, p. 196). That is, marginal utility posits that the consumer will act in a way so as to 
maximise the margin of benefit or pleasure (utility) of a commodity over its cost. Therefore, value 
becomes a psychological desire that operates between commodities rather than something constituent 
of the commodity itself (i.e. labour), and arises in the process of exchange rather than use or 
production.  
The founding-figures of this revolution (with the exception of Carl Menger), were all quite explicit in 
the necessary appropriation of the energy-concept in abstracting ‘humanity’ out of political economy 
in formulating a thoroughly mathematical depiction of economy. In the work of Irving Fisher, still 
taught as the canonical neoclassical model, the direct imitation of thermodynamics is clear (see fig. 3; 
Mirowski, pp. 193-275).  
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Figure 6: Table of corresponding translations between physics and economics from Fisher.145 
 
The appropriation of thermodynamics in neoclassical economics attempts to naturalise its status, set 
aside from any influence of social practices and normative structures. The economic system becomes 
a scientific reality, something unable to be critiqued directly, but only managed and tamed. Economy 
becomes reified through an application to scientific thermodynamics. 
And yet, the formulations of reification have also been critiqued for their inability to open up the 
‘black box’ of the economy. Rahel Jaeggi points out how, in early Critical Theory, the expansion of 
the commodity structure into the realms of rationality (and rationality’s subsequent disruption found 
in alienation, oppression, psychopathology even) leaves the specific economic practices of capitalism 
largely untouched. 146 Likewise, the Habermasian colonisation of the lifeworld actively maintains the 
notion that economic processes rule themselves. If Jaeggi’s point is accepted, TCA details a 
communicatively organised intersubjective-lifeworld only to leave the economic structures imbued 
with an undesirable autonomy similar to the neoclassicists.  
Jaeggi reiterates the necessity of understanding the economy in a wider sense through conceiving it as 
a set of ‘social economic practices’.147 As a set of practices (i.e. a form of life), economy can only 
exist and make sense against a backdrop of social meaning. Yet the embeddedness of practices related 
                                                          
145 Image retrieved from Irving Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), p. 85. 
146 Rahel Jaegi, ‘A Wide Concept of Economy: Economy as a social practice and the critique of capitalism’, in 
Critical Theory in Critical Times: Transforming the Global Political and Economic Order, ed. by P. Deutscher 
and C. Lafont (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).  
147 Jaeggi, p. 163.  
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to economy, such as what can be considered a commodity, means that a complete distinction is both 
impossible and misleading.   
Economic practices, therefore, must be transformed alongside the social practices reached in 
understanding. ‘The moment of crisis forces reflection on and adjustments of practices—a re-creation 
of practices—that were previously taken for granted’.148 
Returning to our opening example of Nordhaus, it becomes clear that his refusal to recognise that the 
crisis of global warming directly confronts an economic system orientated towards continual growth 
represents a typical case of functional-reification. Abstracting the rules of economy, like a game of 
chess, the reduction of social change to the correcting of pesky externalities denotes the separation of 
economics from its embeddedness in the processes of society (global warming is, after all, a social 
pathology). The symbolic role of the energy concept, as we have shown, has made this reduction 
appear viable.  
Economic organisation allows for one of the most powerful avenues of affecting social change. Yet as 
an institutional discipline economics feels inclined to award its own apathy. After all, the milk isn’t 
just sour, the kitchen is on fire.  
* 
Applying the lifeworld-reification to a critique of markets brings out some important similarities to 
Karl Polanyi’s foundational work on marketisation, The Great Transformation, a historical evaluation 
of legal-economic fluctuations in marketisation and counter-movements throughout the long 
nineteenth century.149  
Not unlike TCA, Polanyi notes that at times of heavy marketisation, ‘Instead of economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’.150 This process 
is marked by the creation of certain ‘fictitious’ (reified?151) commodities—money, land, and labour—
                                                          
148 Jaeggi, p.167. 
149 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]). The similarities between Habermas and Polanyi has also been noted in Alexander 
Ebner, ‘Marketization: Theoretical reflections building on the perspectives of Polanyi and Habermas’, Review of 
Political Economy, 27, 3 (2015), 369-89. 
150 Polanyi, p. 60.  
151 Polanyi explicitly states: ‘Marx’s assertion of the fetish character of the value of commodities refers to the 
exchange value of genuine commodities and has nothing in common with the fictitious commodities mentions 
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which determine the political approach to marketisation. As legal regulations on these fictitious 
commodities become more relaxed, marketisation subsequently increases. Yet contradictions inherent 
in deregulating fictitious commodities create protectionist counter-movements, such as the 
Speenhamland system or the abandonment of the gold standard.152  
I would argue to expand Polanyi’s argument to include energy in the list of fictitious commodities. As 
since its inception as a scientific abstraction in Victorian Britain, energy has been reified into a 
commodity without considering the contradictions of doing so. As seen in §2.2, this has been 
achieved by reifying energy into a cultural object used to obfuscate the consumption of other 
commodities, fuels. 
In Polanyi’s analysis, inherent contradictions emerge out of the marketisation of fictitious 
commodities such as labour, for the complete abstraction of labour is impossible without leaving a 
trace, that of the human life attached to it: ‘For the alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be 
shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual 
who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity’.153 Fuel and energy are currently treated as 
a commodity in much the same way, in that they are regulated through market supply and demand 
processes. Yet this treatment is an inherently unstable process, as it assumes that the extraction and 
burning of fuel is inconsequential, and that fuel is something produced for sale rather than something 
that occurs, say, over millions of years in unmediated processes.  
Marketisation that assumes the commodifiability of hydrocarbon fuel without consequence has been 
instrumental in the rapidly encroaching disasters of global warming. As disasters and global events in 
Polanyi’s system spur on the counter-marketisation movements, it is ecological disaster (both looming 
and present) that will ultimately push for rebuking fuel as a commodity. And yet, when promises are 
being made for net-zero greenhouse emissions by 2050—requiring masses of renewable sources if 
energy consumption is going to remain anywhere near its current level—the potential ills of 
commodifying these new, clean forms of energy supply are yet to reveal themselves. 154 Part of the 
                                                          
above’ (Polanyi, p. 76, fn). However, as reification here is the creation of the commodity out of the immaterial, I 
believe the expansion of Marx by Lukács may be applicable.  
152 See, Fred Block, ‘Polanyi’s Double Movement and the Reconstruction of Critical Theory’, Revue 
interventions économiques, 38 (2008), for a reinterpretation of this approach. For an outline of fictitious 
commodities, see Joy Paton, ‘Labour as a (Fictitious) Commodity: Polanyi and the capitalist “Market 
Economy”’, The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 21, 1, (2010), 77-87 
153 Polanyi, p. 76.  
154 Roger Harrabin, ‘Climate change: UK government to commit to 2050 target’, BBC, 12 June 2019, 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-48596775> [accessed 25 September 2019]. 
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transformation of the energy abstraction, therefore, must be to remove its status as a commodity, and 
towards a notion of basic necessity.   
75 
 
Conclusion 
 
But first the notion that man has a body 
distinct from his soul is to be expunged; this 
I shall do, by printing in the infernal method, by 
corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and me- 
dicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and 
displaying the infinite which was hid. 
If the doors of perception were cleansed 
everything would appear to man as it is, in- 
finite. 
For man has closed himself up till he sees  
all things thro’ narrow chinks of his cavern. 
--Blake, Marriage of Heaven and Hell, p.14. 
The concept of energy will be indispensable in the fight against global warming, as the production, 
transportation, and efficient transformation of clean and responsible energy sources necessarily entails 
their quantified measurement. Yet, as the connection between fuel sources and culture is slowly 
unravelled, uncovering the obscured influences of an oil-electric capitalism, the cultural facet of 
science requires similar investigation.155 This dissertation has attempted to outline some ways in 
which the energy concept itself has been complicit in the irresponsible practices and social 
organisations that have brought about the climate disaster, and the obligations that accompany the 
energy concept from its emergence in the science of European industrialism. 
I have argued that the connection between social practices and rationality, inherent in the three 
approaches of Critical Theory from Lukács to Habermas, can be applied to the analysis of scientific 
abstractions. Reification, therefore, has been defined as a process through which these abstractions 
either exceed their scope of application, or become viewed as static entities that validate damaging 
practices, such as fossil fuel use. Consequently, the transformation of abstractions is not only possible 
but necessary, not by appealing to an idea of unabstracted reality, but rather by mapping the 
obligations of scientific abstractions against those obligations to social justice or an intersubjective 
rationality.   
                                                          
155 Buell, ‘A Short History of Oil Cultures’. 
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Necessary to this argument is the notion that—though perhaps the case with all abstractions—
scientific abstractions covertly oblige us to their world outlook. This position is partly derived from 
Isabelle Stengers, who recognises the inherent political significance of scientific concepts and the 
importance of their trajectory through cultural realms:  
Once the neutrino, the atom, or DNA move away from the very specific site, the 
network of labs, where they achieved their existence, once they are taken up in 
statements that unbind existence, invention, and proof, they can change meaning and 
become the vectors of what might be called ‘scientific opinion’.156 
The Critical Theory outlined in this dissertation concurs with Stengers in the rejection of a unified 
scientific outlook. Therefore, an ecocritical theory of abstractions investigates the ways in which 
abstractions are not ‘compossible’, and shares with Stengers the intention of mapping their 
diversifying obligations and outlooks: ‘No unifying body of knowledge will ever demonstrate that the 
neutrino of physics can coexist with the multiple worlds mobilised by ethnopsychiatry. Nonetheless, 
such coexistence has a meaning, and it has nothing to do with tolerance or disenchanted 
scepticism’.157 Consequently, an attempt has been made to avoid the anti-scientific trappings often 
found in critical social theories, instead endeavouring to seek out the meaningful incompatibilities 
between energy and global warming; or even in suggesting to transform the energy abstraction as part 
of a radical re-conception in the transition to alternative fuels.  
The obligation that the energy concept provokes is one of unification, of intertranslatability, and 
productivity—perhaps a consequence of its crucible in the nineteenth-century European scientific 
community. Regardless, energy’s influence proved so great as to envelop the scientific practice it 
emerged within, providing the framework for those who wished to emulate scientific research in the 
realms of human psychology or society. These emulations by the ‘human sciences’ sparked rebuttals 
from Critical Theory, pointing out the palpable contradictions and insufficiency in such imitation. 
These rebuttals where originally intended to show the historical complexity and social responsibility 
inherent in the study of such abstractions as ‘mind’ or ‘society’. I hope to have shown, however, that 
global warming has made the very same considerations necessary when studying scientific 
abstractions such as energy.  
The sense that the theory of abstractions outlined is ‘ecocritical’ stems from its goal for uncovering 
the unecological practices that scientific abstractions may demand if left un-investigated and 
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untransformed. However, it is also in its acceptance of particular ecocritical ‘tenets’, such as an 
aversion to anthropocentrism and, perhaps more importantly, a rejection of the nature-society binary. 
Concurrent with this argument is a rejection of holism; that the sum is greater than its parts, or that 
ecology should necessarily replace abstraction. Rejecting the holistic approach has partly consisted in 
revealing its status as merely another abstraction, more ‘identity thinking’ in Adorno’s terms, one that 
has been used in justifying systems of thought from utopian socialism to fascism. 
Critical Theory, together with Whitehead’s ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, accepts the energy 
concept unreservedly but is weary of its prioritisation. Yet in rejecting the holistic ‘bigger picture’, the 
challenge becomes how to include claims to ethical, somatic, and historical social justice in the 
transformation of fluid abstractions. And with this, a question arises as to what a transformed 
conception of energy would look like? 
The reification critique denotes the inherent contradictions in separating one’s own abilities such as 
‘labour power’ from oneself, i.e. the impossibility of separating labour from the labouring body. I 
have argued that these same contradictions emerge in energy production. This suggests that a 
reformed energy abstraction would make some account for its source in fuel. Perhaps this is a rather 
limited sentiment, as it assumes that energy only denotes the energy market. However, it is precisely 
this limited aspect of energy that makes its reification possible. Energy is prioritised for its vagueness 
and intertranslatability over fuel, an abstraction that incorporates its extraction and the consequences 
of consumption. 
We witness in the example of the BP rebranding this exact form of obfuscation. An appeal to the 
‘cleanness’ of energy, pulling a green and yellow blanket over one billion three hundred fifty million 
five hundred thousand barrels of oil every year. 
* 
The reification critique inherent in Habermasian theory has also been conveyed as one concerned with 
abstractions. Namely, the delineation of the correct abstractions for social organisation, which 
Habermas takes to be the obligations in accepting an ideal communication paradigm. The colonisation 
of the lifeworld by system results in reification effects as communicative rationality is replaced by the 
instrumental rationality inherent in capitalist systems such as markets and law. Such a position is 
concurrent with the rejection of holism; it doesn’t apply to a ‘totality of existence’ that, for example, 
the market system subtracts from. Rather it concedes that the market outlook necessarily subsumes all 
into its field, commodifying everything from tables, to linen, to people, to planets. The abstractive 
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system that the market concept represents must therefore be mapped with other incompossible 
outlooks.  
Which brings us back to our critique of economic orthodoxy, which never strays too far from Marx 
when he states: 
The folly of identifying a specific social relationship of production with the thing-like 
[dingliche] qualities of certain articles is what strikes us most forcibly whenever we 
open any textbook on economics and see on the first page how the elements of the 
process of production, reduced to their basic form, turn out to be land, capital and 
labour…this is a very convenient method by which to demonstrate the eternal 
validity of the capitalist mode of production and to regard capital as an immutable 
natural element in human production as such.158 
Added to this here in the ‘thing-like qualities of certain articles’ is the energy-concept itself, as 
something immutable yet intertranslatable; economics treats all energy as a commodity regardless of 
its source, an equivalence which views the problem of global warming as requiring nothing more than 
the removal of the ‘negative externality’ that is complete ecological decimation. Reforming the 
energy abstraction will be removing its status as a commodity, even when a hypothetical transition to 
green fuels has been made, to prevent future contradiction. 
Concurrently, the energy concept has been implicated in justifying the dominant economic paradigm 
of neo-classical economics. I argue that this is indicative of the obligations of intertranslatability in 
the energy concept, of the disregard for all other value than utility, that still exerts its authority over 
systems of economic opinion.  
 
  
                                                          
158 Results of the Immediate Process of Production, in Marx, p. 998, emphasis in original. 
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